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I. PUZZLES OF LEGIBILITY AND OF LEGITIMACY
This six-meter aluminum windswept female form hangs as if a shingle
on a busy street corner in Melbourne, Australia.' What possessed
designers in 2002 to put this odd image outside a building and assume that
passers-by would connect the imagery to courts, rather than see the figure
as a warrior princess, an opera singer, or find it incomprehensible? Why
do readers of this volume recognize this image as "Justice," and why does
that legibility matter today?
Those questions reflect one theme in Representing Justice: Invention,
Controversy, and Rights in City-States and Democratic Courtrooms,2 in
which we explored the relationship, over centuries, between courts and
democracy. The visual narratives adorning adjudication reveal the
disjuncture between contemporary iterations of adjudication and their
historic antecedents. Rulers of all kinds have needed to enforce their laws
and, over centuries, enshrined Justice as their marker. More recent social
movements have transformed adjudication into a democratic practice, and
courthouses have come to replace Justice as an icon not only of
adjudication but of government more generally. Thus, even as the
pictorial recedes, the material presentations continue to reveal the
ideological premises of adjudication.
A brief preview of the components of our argument is in order. First,
adjudication is proto-democratic, in that courts were an early site of
constraint on government. Even in eras when judges were obliged to be
loyal servants of monarchies and of republican states, judges were bound
by rules dictating their treatment of disputants and instructing them to
"hear the other side." By publicly resolving disputes and punishing
violators, rulers acknowledged through rituals of adjudication that
something other than pure power legitimated their authority. Because
performance required an audience, it was an avenue for power to shift as
1. Figure I is a photograph by Ken Irwin of an aluminum Lady of Justice, created by William
Eicholtz in 2002 and set above the front entrance of the Victoria County Court, a building designed by
Daryl Jackson of SKM Lyons Architects, which serves as an intermediate trial court with both civil
and criminal jurisdiction. See COUNTY COURT OF VICTORIA, http://www.countycourt.vic.gov.au (last
visited Feb. 6, 2012). Our thanks to Chief Judge Michael Rozenes of the County Court of Victoria for
assistance in obtaining permission to reproduce the image, to the Challenger Financial Services Group
and the Liberty Group, and to the sculptor, William Eicholtz, for permitting reproduction of this
figure.
2. JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION, CONTROVERSY, AND
RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS (2011). The images reproduced in the
Color Plates and in this Essay, with the exception of Figures 11, 14, 15, and 17-20, are republished in
relationship to our book, Representing Justice.
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spectators became active observers, able to see and eventually to judge
state provision of dispute resolution services. Public adjudication was thus
one of the means by which sovereign power moved toward the populace.
Second, democracy changed adjudication. Aspects of modem
adjudication-obligatory public access, judicial independence, critical
appraisals of procedural fairness, and equal access of all persons-are the
result of political and social movements of the past three centuries that
render today's courts novel. During the Renaissance, the public was
invited to watch spectacles of judgment and of punishment. Yet, while
witnessing power, the public was not presumed to possess the authority to
contradict it. Unruly crowds were a possibility, prompting (as Michel
Foucault famously charted) the privatization of punishment.'
But over time, court proceedings became obligatorily public, as
illustrated in the 1676 Charter of the English Colony of West New Jersey,
which provided that "in all publick courts of justice for trials of causes,
civil or criminal, any person or persons . . . may freely come and attend."'
A century later, the new states in North America took this precept to
heart, as the words "all courts shall be open,"' coupled with clauses
promising remedies for harms to persons' property and person, were
reiterated in many of their constitutions. The practice of "publicity," to
borrow Jeremy Bentham's term, enabled what Bentham called the
"Tribunal of Public Opinion" 6 to assess government actors. As Bentham
explained, while presiding at trial a judge is "under trial."
From the baseline of the Renaissance, the public's new authority to sit
in judgment of judges and, inferentially, of the government, worked a
radical transformation. "Rites" turned into "rights," imposing
requirements that governments provide "open and public" hearings and
respect the independence of judges. As spectators became active
participants ("auditors," again to borrow from Bentham'), courts became
one of many venues contributing to what twentieth-century theorists
termed the "public sphere"--disseminating information that shaped
3. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 7-8 (Alan
Sheridan trans., 1979).
4. CHARTER OR FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF WEST NEW JERSEY, AGREED UPON, at ch. XXIII
(1676), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 188 (Richard L. Perry ed., 1959).
5. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. of 1818 art. I., § 10. See generally Judith Resnik, Fairness in
Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125
HARV. L. REV. 78, 80-81, 104-105 (2011) [hereinafter Resnik, Fairness in Numbers].
6. JEREMY BENTHAM, Constitutional Code (1843), in 9 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 41
(John Bowring ed., Edinburgh, Tait 1843); FREDERICK ROSEN, JEREMY BENTHAM AND
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY: A STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CODE 26-27 (1983).
7. JEREMY BENTHAM, Rationale of Judicial Evidence (1827), in 6 BENTHAM, supra note 6, at
355.
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popular opinion of governments' output.9
Courts were not only contributors to the public sphere but were also
transformed by new ideas about the position of the judge and by a
deepening sense of equality before the law. Instead of subservience to
rulers, judges gained the status of independent actors, authorized to stand
in judgment of the very power that gave them their jurisdiction. The circle
of those eligible to come to court enlarged radically, and the kinds of
harms recognized multiplied. But it was only in the twentieth century that
all persons gained rights in many countries to be in courts, in all the
roles-from litigants, witnesses, jurors, lawyers, and (yet more recently)
judges. (As Adriaan Lanni reminds us, Athenian democracy was "open,
accessible, and participatory" for only a "privileged group of male
citizens.""o)
Formal principles of equal treatment entitled a host of claimants to be
heard and treated with dignity, whatever their race, class, ethnicity, or
gender. Constitutions and transnational conventions insisted that such
hearings be both "public" and "fair," permitting litigants and judges to
assess whether a particular process met the demands of justice. The
transnational codification of the 1966 United Nations Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights summarized these new tenets by proclaiming that
"everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent
independent and impartial tribunal established by law.""
A measure of success can be seen from the rising number of filings in
courts. A few numbers from the United States are exemplary. In the
twenty-first century, state courts deal with some fifty million civil and
criminal cases (traffic cases aside) annually." The growth in the federal
courts, which handle a tiny fraction of that volume (about 365,000 civil
and criminal filings, and more than a million bankruptcy petitions)
reflects twentieth-century commitments to courts. Fewer than 30,000
cases were brought before the federal courts in 1901; ten times that
number were filed by 2001Y. Growing dockets beget judges. In the
9. See JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 97-98 (William Rehg trans., 1996); JORGEN HABERMAS, THE
STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF
BOURGEOIS SOCIETY (Thomas Burger trans., 1991).
10. Adriaan Lanni, Publicity and the Courts of Classical Athens, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 119,
120 (2012); see also STEVEN JOHNSTONE, DISPUTES AND DEMOCRACY: THE CONSEQUENCES OF
LITIGATION IN ANCIENT ATHENS 10-11, 18-20 (1999).
11. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14, Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200
(XXI)A, U.N. Doc. A/6316.
12. NATIONAL CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, EXAMINING THE WORK
OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2008 STATE COURT CASELOADS 20 (2010), available at
http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/csp/2008files/StateCourtCaseloadStatisticsFINAL.pdf.
13. These data are drawn from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Federal Judicial
Caseload Statistics and from the American Law Institute's 1934 study of the business of the U.S.
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middle of the nineteenth century, fewer than forty federal trial judges sat
in courtrooms around the entire United States. By 2001, more than 650
authorized judgeships existed at the trial level. Judges and cases-and
money and politicians-beget courthouses. In 1850, virtually no buildings
owned by the federal government bore the name "courthouse." The
occasional federal courtroom was tucked inside custom houses or in
spaces borrowed from states or private entities. In contrast, by 2010, more
than 550 federal courthouses-so named-had been built.14
The nature of rights changed as well, as whole new bodies of law
emerged, restructuring family life, responding to domestic violence,
reshaping employee and consumer protections, and recognizing
indigenous and civil rights. Courts rescaled in local and national contexts
to cope with rising filings. Crossing borders, governments came together
to create multi-national adjudicatory bodies, from the "Mixed Courts of
Egypt" and the Slave Trade Commissions of the nineteenth century to the
contemporary regional and international courts, such as the European
Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court.
Third, returning to legibility of the Melbourne Justice and previewing
the pictures to come, the female Virtue Justice was once one of many
Virtues displayed in public buildings. Unlike her siblings, however, she is
a remnant of the Renaissance that remains legible to a diverse audience.
We-onlookers-know her because governments of all stripes have
deployed her to bolster their legitimacy as they imposed violence
(reallocating property as well as limiting liberty) in the name of the state.
Over time, Justice became a symbol of government, and courts came to be
an obligation of governance, such that segregated facilities-courthouses,
purpose-built structures dedicated to a specific function-became
commonplace.
Yet the new. equality puts pressure on the visual displays within
courthouses. As women and men of all colors gained recognition as rights
holders, entitled to sue and be sued, to testify, and to judge, a female
figure of Justice became less an abstraction and more a representation of a
person. But who should decide how "she"-Justice-is to look? Once,
elite groups of rulers and patrons controlled commissions-filling
courthouses with portraits of elder statesmen along with the draped (or
naked) female figure of Justice. But during the twentieth century,
conflicts over Justice's color and shape came to the fore. Protests, detailed
below, erupted in the 1930s about a "mulatto" Justice in a federal
courts. For additional details, see RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 2, at ch. 7-9; and Judith Resnik,
Building the Federal Judiciary (Literally and Legally): The Monuments of Chief Justices Taft,
Warren, and Rehnquist, 87 INDIANA L.J. (forthcoming 2012).
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courthouse in Aiken, South Carolina."s The result was to put the image
behind drapes. In contrast, in the same era, a mural on the Ada County
Courthouse in Idaho displayed an "Indian" with hands tied behind his
back and about to be strung up by gun-carrying men.' 6
Pressures of another kind are undermining the public and didactic
practices of adjudication, which brings us to our fourth point. Democracy
has not only changed courts but also challenged them profoundly.
Egalitarianism poses deep problems for polities that have thus far been
unwilling to commit the resources that would support all the adjudicatory
opportunities promised. As the ranks of rights holders expanded, nations
responded not only by creating more judgeships and more courthouses but
also by moving some forms of adjudication offsite, to administrative
tribunals and to procedures that have come to be known by the acronym
ADR-alternative dispute resolution. The resulting fragmentation and
privatization of adjudication has profound implications for the democratic
character of courts.
One example comes from the United States federal system. In 2008,
four times more judges (often termed hearing officers) sat inside federal
agencies than inside federal courts, and these administrative judges
rendered tens of thousands of decisions in disputes brought by recipients
of government benefits, such as veterans, employees, and immigrants
seeking adjustment of their status." In some respects, this evolution has
served to increase the domain of adjudication, because agencies have
modeled their decisionmaking processes after those of courts. Yet this
work occurs with judges less insulated from oversight by the executive
and legislature and at sites generally inaccessible to outside onlookers.
Many other claimants are dealt with by private providers, such as the
Better Business Bureau and associations of arbitrators, where no rights of
access for third parties exist and where no obligations of transparent
accounting are imposed.
For those cases that remain within the courts, judges press litigants to
avoid the public processes of adjudication whenever possible. In the
1990s, England and Wales reformatted procedural rules to facilitate
settlements," and in 2008, the European Community issued a directive that
15. See JACK IRBY HAYES JR., SOUTH CAROLINA AND THE NEW DEAL 63-64 (2001); discussion infra
notes 152-154.
16. John Miller, Idaho's Lynching Murals To Get Explanations, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Oct. 19,
2007; see also discussion infra notes 154-156.
17. See Judith Resnik, Migrating, Morphing, and Vanishing: The Empirical and Normative
Puzzles ofDeclining Trial Rates in Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 783 (2004).
18. See LORD WOOLF, HER MAJESTY'S STATIONARY OFFICE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: FINAL
REPORT TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALES (July
1996); Hazel Genn, What is Civil Justice For? Reform, ADR, and Access to Justice, 24 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 397, 401-02 (2012).
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all national courts promote mediation of cross-border disputes.19 Parallel
movements across borders have shifted the ideology of judging away from
the public acts of adjudication toward more private managerial roles,
overseeing lawyers and promoting conciliation.2 0 With the devolution of
adjudication to agencies, the outsourcing to private providers, and the
reconfiguration of court-based processes toward settlement for both civil
and criminal cases, the occasions for public observation of and
involvement in adjudication are diminishing. By 2010, in the federal
courts of the United States, trials began in only two of one hundred civil
cases, and the decline in the rate of trials (despite decades in which filings
had risen) gained the moniker of the "vanishing trial." 21
A dramatic example of the retreat from courts came from decisions by
all branches of government in the United States after the terrorist
destruction of the World Trade Center's Twin Towers in September of
2001. Eschewing both the federal and the longstanding military court
system, the Department of Defense created a detention camp at
Guantinamo Bay, a United States naval base in Cuba. "Camp Justice" is
the makeshift name, reflecting the ad hoc efforts that have pieced together
rules of procedure and evidence, at a venue to which the public does not
have ready access and at which military personnel dispatch individuals to
serve as prosecutors and as judges.
Although one might be tempted to bracket the rules for alleged
terrorists as unique responses to horrific events, a close analysis of other
government regulations shows the continuum on which the
decisionmaking regime at Guantinamo Bay sits. Ordinary prisoners
confined in the United States and ordinary individuals in administrative
agencies also have few opportunities for independent judges to decide
claims of right in public. Despite the many affirmative iterations in state,
national, and international documents of "open courts" and independent
judges for all "persons," these aspects of adjudicatory processes are in
jeopardy. Most governments neither structure practices nor adequately
fund their justice systems to make good on promises of equal justice
before the law.
The shift toward privatization of adjudication has many causes, from a
lack of resources to the view that alternative forms of conflict resolution
are more accurate, less expensive, and more user-friendly. Others see a
political backlash, in that some "repeat players" found the glare of
19. See Council Directive 2008/52, art. 1, 2008 O.J. (L 136) 3 (EC).
20. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 374 (1982).
21. See RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 2, at 306-14; Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An
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adjudication disruptive to business practices or governance policies and
successfully "played for the rules" by limiting the reach of courts and by
22constricting access.
Michel Foucault documented governing powers eager to maintain
control by privatizing the technologies of punishment. Today,
adjudication itself is in the process of being removed from public
purview, making the exercise and consequences of public and private
power harder to ascertain. Although built with cutting-edge technologies,
new courthouses are at risk of becoming anachronistic. Illustrative is the
docket of one new transnational court-the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea. From its creation in the 1990s through 2008, a total of
fourteen cases came before it.2 4
Thus, the diminution in the aegis of adjudication and incursions on
courts' authority are masked by a spate of courthouse building projects
creating architecturally important structures that are, in various respects,
distant from the needs for adjudication and the daily activities of judges.2 5
Many new courthouses, often clad in glass to mark justice's transparency,
celebrate courts without embodying reflections on the problems of access,
the histories of injustices under the rubric of the rule of law, and the
complexity of rendering just judgments.
Fifth, the movement away from public adjudication is a problem for
democracies because adjudication has important contributions to make to
democracy. By democracy, we speak not of majoritarian political
processes but rather of aspirations for lawmaking through egalitarian
methods that foster popular input into governing norms and impose robust
constraints on both public and private power. Furthermore, by courts, we
focus on the quotidian activities of ordinary litigation rather than only on
the outcomes of the highest judicial bodies. Constitutional scholars debate
the legitimacy of judicial review in democracies, while we argue that
adjudication itself is a democratic process, which reconfigures power as it
obliges disputants and judges to treat each other as equals, to provide
information to each other, and to offer public justifications for decisions,
based on the interaction of fact and norm. Courts' mandate to operate in
public endows the audience-the public-with the ability and the
authority of critique. Through such participatory parity, 26 public processes
22. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & Soc'y REv. 95 (1974).
23. FOUCAULT, supra note 3, at 8-11.
24. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 2, at 265-72.
25. See Judith Resnik, Dennis Curtis & Allison Tait, Constructing Courts: Architecture, the
Ideology ofJudging, and the Public Sphere, in LAW, CULTURE & VISUAL STUDIES (Richard Sherwin
& Anne Wagner eds., forthcoming 2012).
26. Nancy Frasier offered the term "participatory parity" in explaining that the public sphere
26 [Vol. 24:19
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both teach about democratic practices of norm development and offer the
opportunity for popular input to produce changes in legal rights. The
redundancy of various claims of rights enables debate about the
underlying legal rules. The particular structural obligations of trial level
courts have advantages for producing, redistributing, and curbing power
in a fashion that is generative in democracies.
In sum, courts as we know them today are recent inventions. The
constitutive elements-open access, independent judges authorized to sit
in judgment of the state and to assess the fairness of their own as well as
other decisionmaking procedures, equal and dignified treatment of all
participants-are outgrowths of social movements that transformed the
meaning of legal "personhood," the idea of justice, and the obligations of
government.
Our account is not only a reconstruction of a many-century history of
the idea of "courts" and a normative exploration of the utility of courts for
democratic orders. Our aim is also to make plain the fragility and
contingency of the twentieth-century project for which the word "court"
has become a shorthand. While monumental in ambition and often in
physical girth, the durability of courts as active sites of public exchange
before independent jurists ought not be taken for granted. Like other
venerable institutions of the eighteenth century-the postal service and
the press-courts are vulnerable. The continuation of accessible court
services for ordinary disputants seeking state assistance is far from
assured.
Representing Justice documents these claims by tracing facets of the
imagery that became the political iconography of European town halls
and by exploring the development of purpose-built structures that came to
be called courthouses. We move across oceans and ideas to map the
elaboration of rights that shifted the paradigm of legitimacy for
governments. Like the other authors joining in this Symposium, we probe
the relationships among courts, democracies, and political signification
through puzzling about the intelligibility, import, and durability of
buildings, images, and texts.
Here, we have a more limited set of ambitions-to glimpse facets of the
argument. By probing old imagery, we aim to deepen an appreciation for
what is new inside courtrooms, as well as to draw attention to how the
visual and political history illuminates but cannot sustain democratic
courtrooms. Required instead are new idioms and images to denote the
delineated in Jirgen Habermas's discussion was too unitary a description of the many dynamic sites
of exchange in democracies. See Nancy Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the
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struggles, failures, and challenges that democratic justice entails.
II. RENAISSANCE VIRTUE REDEPLOYED
The designers of the 2002 Victoria County Court in Australia were not
alone in their confidence that a hulking, draped women with sword and
scales marked a building as a courthouse. In Zambia, a Lady Justice
(Figure 2) stands outside a high court,2 7 just as in Brazil, another (Figure
3) is seated in stone outside the 1960s courthouse designed by Oscar
Neimeyer as part of the Brasilia government complex. 2 8
Justice is also regularly seen in commerce, as a catalogue cover (Figure
4) from a law book purveyor, Mathew Bender, makes plain. 29 The
photographed Justice has, since 1812, stood (first in wood and then in
Figure 2. Lady Justice, circa 1988, High Court of Zambia, Lusaka, Zambia.
Photographer: Elizabeth Brundige.
Reproduced courtesy of the photographer.
27. The photograph of Lady Justice, Figure 2, was provided by and is reproduced with the
permission of Elizabeth Brundige, the photographer. The statue, erected during the presidency of Dr.
Kenneth Kaunda, marks the entrance to the High Court of Zambia in Lusaka.
28. Figure 3 is a photograph of Justice, by the sculptor Alfredo Ceschiatti. Installed in 1961, it is
made of granite and measures about II feet by 4.6 feet (3.30 meters by 1.48 meters). Our thanks to
Director Jarbas Silva Marques of the Office of Historic and Artistic Patrimony of Brazil (Diretoria de
Patrim6nio Hist6rico e Artistico-DePHA) and to the Directoria de Patrim6nio Hist6rico e Artistico-
DePHA for permission to reproduce the image.
29. Matthew Bender & Co. Inc., allowed us to reproduce the photograph in Figure 4, the statue
on the top of New York City Hall, that was on a catalogue cover in 1986; Matthew Bender claims no
copyright as to any part of the original photographic or architectural works depicted.
28 [Vol. 24:19
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Figure 3. Justice, Alfredo Ceschiatti, Figure 4. Justice, John Dixey, circa
1961, Supreme Federal Tribunal, Three 1812, on top of New York City Hall,
Powers Square, Brasilia, Brazil. from the cover of the Matthew Bender
Provided and reproduced courtesy of the Directoria de 1986 Law School Catalog.
Patrim6nio Hist6tio e Artistico-DePHA.
Figure 5. Column of Justice (Cosimo de
Medici as Justice), attributed to Romolo
del Tadda, circa 1565-1570, Piazza della
Santa Trinita, Florence, Italy.
Photographer: Allison Tait.
Reproduced courtesy of the photographer.
Reproduced with the permission of Matthew Bender &
Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group.
Matthew Bender claims no copyright as to any part of the
original photographic or architectural works depicted in
this image.
Figure 6. Lady Justice Lucy, Jim and
Judy Brooks, 2002, William Mitchell
College of Law, St. Paul, Minnesota.
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coppero) on top of New York's City Hall." Her stance echoes that of a
sixteenth-century statue-Lorenzo d'Medici as Justice (Figure 5)-that
continues to tower over a square in Florence, Italy.32 His stance was, in
turn, repeated by other rulers, exemplified by a seventeenth-century
painting by Peter Paul Rubens depicting Maria de Medici as Justice
adorned with scales and sword; a parallel eighteenth-century portrait, by
Verrio, of England's Queen Anne as Justice;33 and a mural on the streets
of Bagdad in which Saddam Hussein was shown with sword and scales.3 4
A contemporary parallel is Lady Justice Lucy (Figure 6), which stood in
2002 in front of William Mitchell College of Law in St. Paul, Minnesota
as part of that city's celebration of the cartoonist Charles Schultz," and
which serves as a reminder that Justice is also regularly deployed in jest.
Yet a pause is in order to reflect on the oddity of all that we have
shown. How utterly weird it is to look at a statue of a chunky child,
draped, blindfolded and holding sword and scales, and find it legible
rather than incoherent and, moreover, see it as an obvious reference to
law.
That these images are experienced as ordinary is a tribute to the
political energies of diverse governments that have produced and
reproduced this shared referent. The claim is not that Justice is ubiquitous
30. The Municipal Building, dating from 1803-1812, was designed by John McComb Jr. and
Joseph Francois Mangin. The original sculpture, commissioned by the building's architects, was a
"mass-produced" object made by William H. Mullins's studio. The figure, "depicted without a
blindfold, was the work of John Dixey, a sculptor trained in London." See City Hall Roof Restoration
Project, OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, http://www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/om/html/cityhall.html (last visited Feb.
12, 2012).
31. A nineteenth-century travel guide quoted a once-famous 1819 poem (called Fanny, by Fitz-
Greene Halleck):
And on our City Hall a Justice stands
A neater form was never made of board
Holding majestically in her hands
A pair of steelyards and a wooden sword,
And looking down with complaisant civility
Emblem of dignity and durability.
WILLIAM LORING ANDREWS, THE JOURNEY OF ICONOPHILES AROUND NEW YORK IN SEARCH OF THE
HISTORICAL AND PICTURESQUE 27-28 (1897).
32. The image in Figure 5 is provided and reproduced with permission of Allison Tait. The
Column of Justice, a gift of Pope Pius IV, has been in use since 1565 and commemorates the Battle of
Montemurlo.
33. Verrio's Queen Anne as Justice, Hampton Court Palace, circa 1704, is reproduced in RESNIK
& CURTIS, supra note 2, at 83 fig.63.
34. A photograph of that mural, described as "Mural of Saddam Hussein with the Scales of
Justice," was published on April 23, 2007 in the New York Times to accompany the story U.S. Seeks
Solid Core to Fix Iraq's Broken Legal System. A reproduction can be found in RESNIK & CURTIS,
supra note 2, at 6.
35. The artists Jim and Judy Brooks did a series of sculptures entitled Looking for Lucy as a
public arts summer event sponsored by the Capital City Partnership and the City of St. Paul,
Minnesota. Our thanks to William Mitchell College of Law for providing us with the image in Figure
6 and permission to reproduce it.
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(we do not offer imagery from all social orders, past or present) but rather
that an array of practices-political, visual, literary, and social-produced
through activities ranging from imperial conquests and colonialism to
democratic governments, professional organizations, commercial
entrepreneurs, and news media have shaped a trans-temporal and
transnational set of references and processes that have traction. As
political propaganda, Justice has had a remarkable run.
III. PUBLIC PERFORMANCE
The obvious questions are what renders these portrayals
comprehensible, what histories produced them, and what they imply for
contemporary social ordering. As documented by Kathryn Slanski,36
Joseph Manning, and Adriaan Lanni,3 8 sovereigns in ancient
Mesopotamia, Egypt, and Greece all relied on public performance of their
adjudicatory powers." These events were not free-form but were located
in terms of place (such as the "gate of the city,"40 or outside a temple,4 1 or
in the agora and other markets) as well as in terms of process.4 2
Instructions organized the interactions, giving disputants, witnesses, and
jurists role-obligations. Their acts, performed before an audience, were
recorded in clay, stone, and papyrus.
Manning offers the term "connective justice"43 to capture the
interdependent communal obligations understood in ancient Egypt to
bridge (or to join) "divine and human worlds."" Judgment processes were
part of social orders aiming for stability. But, as Steven Fraade comments,
the communal structure of these exchanges should not conceal that, even
when bounded and didactic, the point was to organize state violence.4 5
36. Kathryn E. Slanski, The Law of Hammurabi and Its Audience, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 97
(2012).
37. J.G. Manning, The Representation of Justice in Ancient Egypt, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. Ill
(2012) [hereinafter Manning, Representation of Justice]; see also J.G. Manning, Order and Law:
Shaping the Law in a New State, in THE LAST PHARAOHS 8 19-62 (Raymond Westbrook ed., 2003).
38. Lanni, supra note 10.
39. Roman practices over several centuries are detailed in essays in SPACES OF JUSTICE IN THE
ROMAN WORLD (F. De Angelis ed., 2010.) The function of the legal regime is analyzed in CLIFFORD
ANDO, LAW, LANGUAGE AND EMPIRE IN THE ROMAN TRADITION (2011).
40. Slanski, supra note 36, at 99.
41. Manning, Representation ofJustice, supra note 37, at 113. Passages in the Hebrew Bible also
mention "judgment at the gate." See Psalms 119:137. Architects of the Israeli Supreme Court's 1992
building cited such references as influencing their design. See RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 2, at 209.
42. Slanski, supra note 36.
43. Manning, Representation of Justice, supra note 37, at 114 n.14 (relying on JAN ASSMANN,
THE MIND IN ANCIENT EGYPT 2002).
44. Id. at 118.
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Public adjudicatory performances were then (as now) in service of the
preservation of the authority of the polities that produced them.
Didactic judgment practices, accompanied by pictorial and textual
directives, continued through the Medieval periods into Renaissance
Europe. Indeed, courts could be understood to have been the "first municipal
governments," brought into being to decide disputes and then acquiring
additional administrative functions.46 By the end of the twelfth century,
European town leaders had begun to construct civic spaces to augment the
open-market squares, churches, and private residences that were sometimes
used for communal business.4 7
Evidence in Italy of public buildings devoted specifically to governance
date from that era and a bit later in Northern Europe. 8 The emergence of
such buildings is linked to the growth of urban centers, the development of
interest in and the need for law, and conflicts over power in which empires
sprawled and receded. Civic leaders sought to express (sometimes
competitively) their locale's prosperity by investing in building projects to
mark and to make their identities. This interest in "civil self-fashioning"49
resulted in structures-styled town hall, town house, rathaus, or civic
palace-'"clearly designed to dominate" their environs.so And within, rooms
were designated for holding court.
IV. INSCRIBING JUDICIAL SUBSERVIENCE
What do the material records teach about adjudication then? In a world
with limited literacy and no or few printed materials," the visual arts were-
as Ruth Weisberg explains in her essay for this Symposium-a key medium
of instruction, serving as mnemonic aids.52 Rulers relied on depictions of
46. DAVID NICHOLAS, THE GROWTH OF THE MEDIEVAL CITY: FROM LATE ANTIQUITY TO THE
EARLY FOURTEENTH CENTURY 141-45 (1997) (surveying the "folkmoot" of London, the "alderman" in
Denmark, the "scabini" of the Low Country, the "jurs and 6chevins" in France, the "rat" or council in
Germany, and various other configurations of guilds, citizens, councilors, and assemblies).
47. ROBERT TITITLER, ARCHITECTURE AND POWER: THE TOWN HALL AND THE ENGLISH URBAN
COMMUNITY, 1500-1640, at 92-93 (1991).
48. See, e.g., KRISTIN ELDYSS SORENSEN ZAPALAC, "IN His IMAGE AND LIKENESS": POLITICAL
ICONOGRAPHY AND RELIGIOUS CHANGE IN REGENSBURG, 1500-1600, at 26-55 (1990); Colin
Cunningham, For the Honour and Beauty of the City: The Design of Town Halls, in 2 SIENA, FLORENCE
AND PADUA: ART, SOCIETY AND RELIGION 1280-1400, at 29-54 (Diana Norman ed., 1995) [hereinafter
ART, SOCIETY AND RELIGION]; and Juergen Schulz, The Communal Buildings of Parma, 26
MITTEILUNGEN DES KUNSTHISTORISCHEN INSTITUTES IN FLORENZ 279, 280-82 (1982).
49. Fabrizio J. Nevola, Per Ornato Della Cittd: Siena's Strada Romana and Ffeenth-Century Urban
Renewal, 82 ART BULL, 26, 27 (2000).
50. 2 ART, SOCIETY AND RELIGION, supra note 48, at 32.
51. See LUCIEN FEBVRE & HtNRI-JEAN MARTIN, THE COMING OF THE BOOK: THE IMPACT OF
PRINTING, 1450-1800, at 21-60 (David Gerard trans., photo reprint 2000). Febvre and Martin estimated
that in 1500 about 20 million volumes were available; by 1600, 200 million books were in circulation. Id.
at 262.
52. See Ruth Weisberg, The Art of Memory and the Allegorical Personification of Justice, 24 YALE
32 [Vol. 24:19
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allegorical scenes of religious and classical narratives to link their regimes to
god, prosperity, power, and peace. The visual record demonstrates that,
while superficially similar, the role of the judge was radically different.
Unlike today's independent jurist, protected from government oversight, the
judge then was repeatedly instructed to be subservient to higher
authorities-to the Christian God and the civic rulers that embodied that
power. Judges were warned that they, as well as those whom they judged,
were subjects required to demonstrate obedience and loyalty.
This point was made in scenes of the Last Judgment,54 which gained a
particular place of honor in northern Europe, where some municipal laws
required that the image be posted in courtrooms." One oft-cited source came
from provisions written between 1330 and 1386 in Magdeburg Province 6
and adopted in various localities. A sixteenth-century edition explained:
When and where the judge sits in judgment, in the same place and in
the same hour, God sits in his heavenly court, above the judges and
above the magistrates. And so a judge in the town hall should have
painted the strict court of our Lord Jesus Christ. This is so that he
should think of the Court of our Lord; and that he should also think
that he is a judge of the people, that God has saved with his precious
blood. And so David speaks: "Juste judicate filii hominum. Judge
fairly, you children of men, when you judge according to worldly
measures (that is, you judge men on the earthly level, God will judge
whether your judgment was just or unjust) the same judgment will be
passed in the same hour over you, it is fair, and so it was of you that
the Prophet David speaks.""
J.L. & HUMAN. 259, 262 (2012); see also LINA BOLZONI, THE GALLERY OF MEMORY: LITERARY AND
ICONOGRAPHIC MODELS IN THE AGE OF THE PRINTING PRESS (Jeremy Parzen trans., 2001).
53. 2 ART, SOCIETY AND RELIGION, supra note 48, at 29; see also CHRISTIAN-NILS ROBERT, LA
JUSTICE DANS SES DECORS, XVE-XVIE SItCLES (2006).
54. See ZAPALAC, supra note 48, at 194 n.8. Several authors have catalogued the many displays of
the Last Judgment in German and Dutch Town Halls. See, e.g., L'ABBE BOUILLET, LE JUGEMENT
DERNIERDANS L'ART AUX DOUZE PREMIER SItCLES (1894); CRAIG HARBISON, THE LAST JUDGMENT IN
SIXTEENTH CENTURY NORTHERN EUROPE: A STUDY OF THE RELATION BETWEEN ART AND
REFORMATION (1976); URSULA GRIEGER LEDERLE, GERECHTIGKEITSDARSTELLUNGEN IN DEUTSCHEN
UND NIEDERLANDISCHEN RATHXUSERN (1937); WOLFGANG PLEISTER & WOLFGANG SCHILD, RECHT
UND GERECHTIGKEIT IM SPEIGEL DER EUROPAISCHEN KUNST (1988); SUSAN TIPTON, RES PUBLICA BENE
ORDINATA: REGENTENSPIEGEL UND BILDER VON GuTEN REGIMENT, RATHAUSDEKORATIONEN IN DER
FROHEN NEUZEIT (1996); GEORG TROESCHER, WELTGERICHTSBILDER IN RATHAUSERN UND
GERICHTSSTATTEN, in 11 WEST GERMAN YEARBOOK FOR ART HISTORY 129-214 (1939).
55. Contemporary discussions of this requirement of German law refer either to such provisions
as from the Magdeburg Laws or rely on Ulrich Tengler, writing a legal treatise in the early 1500s.
See, e.g., GERALD STRAUSS, LAW, RESISTANCE, AND THE STATE: THE OPPOSITION TO ROMAN LAW
IN REFORMATION GERMANY 195 (1986); ZAPALAC, supra note 48, at 48-49, 76-68.
56. TROESCHER, supra note 54, at 148. These multivolume codes in various versions were
adopted in different city-states. See, e.g., PAUL LABAND, DAS MAGDEBURG-BRESLAUER
SYSTEMATISCHE SCHOFENRECHT AUS DER MITTE DES XIV (Scientia-Verlag 1967) (1863).
57. Sechsich Weychbild und Lehenrecht, art. XVI, fol. XXVIIb (Leipzig, Michael Blum 1537).
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Throughout "the fifteenth and especially the sixteenth century in northern
Europe it became standard practice to have a Last Judgment painted on the
wall behind the judges' bench.""
But what was to be shown? The Gospel of Matthew, an oft-cited text,
described that the "Son of Man . . . will sit in state on his throne,"
surrounded by angels, with the nations gathered about him.59 "He will
separate men into two groups, as a shepherd separates the sheep from the
goats," and "he will say to those on his left hand, 'The curse is upon you;
go from my sight to the eternal fire that is ready for the devil and his
angels. "'60
How were these phrases translated pictorially? During many
centuries after the lifetime of Jesus, the answer was not often. Art historians
have found relatively few images before the thirteenth century that
referenced the Last Judgment.61 Thereafter, the theme became common in
many churches, with scenes of Jesus separating sheep from goats or
apocalyptic endings of the world.62 Dante's Divine Comedy, completed in
1314, provided additional inspiration, prompting some detailing of the
horrors of hell. Many famous renditions-such as Michelangelo's Last
Judgment in the Vatican's Sistine Chapel-focused on resurrection rather
Mike Widener and translated by Stella Burch Elias, Yale Law School 2010.
58. SAMUEL Y. EDGERTON, JR., PICTURES AND PUNISHMENT: ART AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
DURING THE FLORENTINE RENAISSANCE 32 (1985). Such scenes were then less common in Italy. Id. at 33.
59. Matthew 25:31-32. Unless otherwise noted, references to Biblical text in this Essay are from
THE NEW ENGLISH BIBLE WITH THE APOCRYPHA (Charles Harold Dodd ed., 1970).
60. Matthew 25:31-46. Other biblical references, such as verses from Psalms, identified the Lord
"seated on [his] throne" as a "righteous judge." Psalm 9:4; see also Luke 22:30 (in which Jesus tells the
disciples, "you shall eat and drink at my table in my kingdom and sit on thrones as judges of the
twelve tribes of Israel"); Proverbs 20:8 ("A king seated on the judgment-throne has an eye to sift all
that is evil"); Psalm 9:8-9 ("The Lord thunders, he sits enthroned for ever: he has set up his throne, his
judgment-seat. He it is who will judge the world with justice"). One can also find in The Second
Letter of Paul to the Corinthians 5:10 a reference to "the tribunal of Christ." Another text, less often
cited, is The First Letter of Paul to the Thessalonians 4:16-17 ("because at the word of command, at
the sound of the archangel's voice and God's trumpet-call, the Lord himself will descend from
heaven; first the Christian dead will rise, then we who are left alive shall join them, caught up in
clouds to meet the Lord in the air"). Marcia Hall also pointed to Paul's writing that on the final day
the Lord himself will descend from heaven with a cry of command, with the archangel's call,
and with the sound of the trumpet of God. And the dead in Christ will rise first; then we who
are alive, who are left, shall be caught up together with them in the clouds to meet the Lord in
the air.
Marcia B. Hall, Michelangelo's Last Judgment: Resurrection of the Body and Predestination, 58 ART
BULL. 85, 89-91 (1976). Other possible sources for Last Judgment scenes include catechetical texts,
materials from St. Augustine's De Civitate Dei (The City of God) of413-26 CE, and literature, such
as Dante's Divine Comedy. See ERWIN PANOFSKY, EARLY NETHERLANDISH PAINTING 270-310
(1953); Janey L. Levy, The Keys ofthe Kingdom ofHeaven: Ecclesiastical Authority and Hierarchy in the
Beaune Altarpiece, 14 ART HIST. 18, 19-27 (1991).
61. One earlier representation is at the sixth-century Church of St. Apollinare Nuovo in Ravenna,
Italy, where mosaics depict Christ separating sheep from goats. See, e.g., BOUILLET, supra note 54, at 10.
Another well-known mosaic Last Judgment is in the Torcello Cathedral from the twelfth century. Id. at 57.
62. Id. at 60; EDGERTON,supra note 58, at 23.
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than on the act of judgment.
When, however, depictions of the Last Judgment moved into
courtrooms and onto printed books about law, the scenes came to
resemble the places and the work that the pictures were meant to
influence." Heavenly judgment was imagined to look like what
authorities structured for earthly judges. The convergence can be seen in
pictures such as the fifteenth-century painting, the Courtroom Scene with
Last Judgment and Portrait of Niclas Strobel (Figure 7) that hung on a
wall of the Town Hall of Graz in Austria,6 5 and which follows a formula
found in other such paintings, in which the bottom half depicts human








Reproduced courtesy of the
Stauimuseumn Graz.
63. Hall, supra note 60, at 89.
64. Displays of the Last Judgment in Northern Europe were found in the Town Halls of Regensburg,
Lineburg, Basel, Kampen, Louvain, Bruges, Nuremberg, Graz, Danzig, Emden, Bautzen, and Haarlem.
See HARBISON, supra note 54, at 54-58, 177-80; WOLFGANG SCHILD, ALTE GERICHTSBARKEIT: VOM
GorrESURTEL Bis ZuM BEGINN DER MODERNEN RECHTSPRECHUNG 12-28 (1980).
65. The painting is by an unknown artist; an inscription dates the painting to 1478, more than a
decade after the central worldly figure, identified as Niclas Strobel, had held the town offices of judge and
mayor. See TROESCHER, supra note 54, at 172. Our thanks to Otto Hochreiter, Katharina Gabalier, and
Franz Leitgeb, who directed us to the source for Figure 7 and to Stadtmuseum Graz for providing us
with the image and permission to use it.
66. See ZAPALAC, supra note 48, at 48-53.
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The Graz version could be read as a vertical diptych with two discrete
scenes. On the bottom, the jurist (Strobel) presides over what has been
identified as an oath-taking, with counselors and spectators watching. At
the top, Christ, arms outstretched, sits on a heavenly throne surrounded by
counselors-Mary kneeling on his left, and a male on his right. The
symmetry created through the layout and coloration (red drapery for both
the jurist and Christ, with beige, black, and red clothes for figures in both
Earth and heaven) could suggest that one kind of judgment parallels the
other.
But the two male spectators, leaning over the sides of the benches and
plausibly representing the public, have their gazes focused heavenward, as
do three of the seated councilors. By following their eyes and looking at the
middle section of the painting, in which the spectators share space with
small, naked embodied souls (either being raised to heaven or condemned to
hell), one can understand that, instead of two scenes, depicted is a single
integrated moment in which Jesus is present in the earthly court."7 He does
not parallel the human judge but waits on the court's earthly decision in
order to render his own judgment on the living characters in the courtroom.
The mid-ground depiction of human souls in transit-to heaven or hell-
underscores what flows from such heavenly judgment.
Art historians debate whether the deployment of the Last Judgment in
town halls was an effort to use religion to bolster the legitimacy of secular
rule68 or evidence of the intermingling of the secular and the religious.6 9 Yet
others understood the two categories to be intermingled in a form of "civic
Christianity."70 Our interest is in how the selection of text and image
reflected an understanding of the role of a judge. The walls that surrounded
judges provided insistent public reminders of the vulnerability of judges and
of the judged, both positioned as subjects before a higher authority.
The imagery of the Last Judgment lost its centrality in town halls long
before its religiosity became problematic for secularizing societies. In
Germany and elsewhere, Last Judgment scenes were replaced with other
historical narratives harkening back to classical and biblical traditions and, in
later centuries, by the abstraction of the Virtue Justice." Explanations for the
eclipse vary depending on the emphasis placed on changing economic
67. The spectators' placement "confused the viewer's perspectival understanding of the scene,"
making "impossible a comfortably distinct reading of two scenes as discrete events." Id. at 49.
68. See EDGERTON,supra note 58, at 22; HARBISON,supra note 54, at 52.
69. ZAPALAC, supra note 48, at 34-35. Zapalac also detailed how court-based processes affected
Church liturgy, with popular dramas positing trials involving Christ and the Devil and with legal texts
portraying Mary as a lawyer defending humanity before Jesus.
70. See DAVID HERLIHY, MEDIEVAL AND RENAISSANCE PISTOIA: THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF AN
ITALIAN TOwN, 1200-1430 (1967).
71. ZAPALAC, supra note 48, at 27-31, 72-81.
[Vol. 24:1936
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conditions, political theories, and religious ideology in the Reformation's
wake. One could read the retreat from Last Judgment depictions to represent
a secularization of the act of judging, a decline in religious authority, a shift
in theology away from redemption, or an embrace of humanism enamored
with classical narratives and of analogies to heroic personages and
communities.
The imagery changed, but instructions on judicial subservience remained
on the walls by way of other narratives drawn from a tradition called
exempla virtutis-acts, "worthy of imitation," and a subset, exempla
iustitiae, providing lessons about justice.72 One oft-displayed scene was The
Judgment of Cambyses (Figures 8 and 9).73 The story comes from the
Historiae, written by Herodotus around 440 B.C.E. and describing the rule
of King Cambyses, said to have lived some hundred years earlier.7 4
According to Herodotus, upon learning that the judge, Sisamnes, was
corrupt, Cambyses ordered him flayed alive. Thereafter, Cambyses
appointed Otanes, the son of Sisamnes, to serve as a jurist and forced the son
to preside on a seat made from the skin of his father.7 5
72. See ELIZABETH MCGRATH, I RUBENS: SUBJECTS FROM HISTORY, TEXT & ILLUSTRATIONS
(1997), in 13 CORPUS RUBENIANUM LUDWIG BURCHARD 7, 33-35 (Amout Balis ed., 1997). As McGrath
explained, a tradition of didacticism that lined the "walls of Renaissance palaces and town halls" relied on
"citation of some deed or saying of the past." Id. at 34; see also Hugo van der Velden, Cambyses for
Example: The Origins and Function of Exemplum Iustitiae in Netherlandish Art of the Fifteenth, Sixteenth
and Seventeenth Centuries, 23 SIMIOLUS: NETHERLANDS Q. HIST. ART 5, 9 (1995) [hereinafter Van der
Velden, Cambyses for Example].
73. See ROBERT, supra note 53, at 24, 74-79; Hans J. van Miegroet, Gerard David's Justice of
Cambyses: Exemplum lustitiae or Political Allegory?, 18 SIMIOLUS: NETHERLANDS Q. HIST. ART 116,
117 (1988) [hereinafter Van Miegroet, Justice of Cambyses]; Hugo van der Velden, Cambyses
Reconsidered: Gerard David's Exemplum lustitiae for Bruges Town Hall, 23 SIMIOLUS: NETHERLANDS Q.
HIST. ART 40, 44-49 (1995) [hereinafter Van der Velden, Cambyses Reconsidered].
74. Cambyses was the son of Cyrus the Great, who conquered Babylon in 539 B.C.E. Cambyses
ruled from around 530 to 521 B.C.E. See HERODOTUS, THE HISTORIES, bk. 3 at 95, 170, 171 (Aubrey de
Selincourt trans., 2003); see also GERALDINE PINCH, EGYPTIAN MYTHOLOGY: A GUIDE TO THE GODS,
GODDESSES, AND TRADITIONS OF ANCIENT EGYPT 34 (2002) (noting that a king who was likely Cambyses
existed and conquered Egypt in 525 B.C.E).
75. HERODOTUS, supra note 74, bk. 5 at 25-26. One translation is:
Darius left as general of all the troops upon the sea-coast Otanes,
son of Sisamnes, whose father King Cambyses slew and flayed,
because that he, being of the number of royal judges, had taken
money to give an unrighteous sentence. Therefore, Cambyses slew
and flayed Sisamnes, and cutting his skin into strips, stretched
them across the seat of the throne whereon he had been wont to sit
when he heard cases. Having so done Cambyses appointed the son
of Sisamnes to be judge in his father's room, and bade him never
to forget in what way his seat was cushioned.
HANS JORIS VAN MIEGROET, GERARD DAVID 143 (1989) [hereinafter VAN MIEGROET, GERARD DAVID].
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Figure 8. Arrest of the Corrupt Judge, left panel. Figure 9. Flaying of the Corrupt
Judge, right panel. The Justice (Judgment) of Cambyses, diptych, Gerard David,
1498, Musea Brugge, Belgium.
Copyright: Musea Brugge, Groeningemeseum. Reproduced with the permission of the copyright holder.
From the thirteenth century onward, versions of this story can be found in
European compilations of classical stories and by the seventeenth century,
regularly portrayed in European town halls.76 Dozens of images exist, but
the vividness of the Judgment of Cambyses by the Flemish artist Gerard
David is noteworthy." This work, commissioned in the late fifteenth century
for the City Hall of Bruges, was hung in 1498 and can now be seen in that
city's museum.
The painting, a diptych with panels almost six feet high and five feet wide,
includes four scenes. 79 Toward the back of the first panel (Figure 8), behind
the arches and under a canopy, one can see the red-robed judge Sisamnes
standing near another figure from whom he is accepting a bag of money. In
the center scene, Cambyses (dressed not as a Persian emperor but like a king
76. LEDERLE, supra note 54, at 44-45 (chronicling the image in painting, glass windows, and
carvings in Manster, Emden, Gdafisk, Konigsberg, Thom, and Breslau); Van der Velden, Cambyses for
Example, supra note 72, at 1 1-16.
77. Gerard David, who lived from about 1460 to 1523, came into focus in the nineteenth century
through James Weale. See W.H. JAMES WEALE, GERARD DAVID: PAINTER AND ILLUMINATOR 6-7 (1895).
For interpretative disagreements about the Brugges diptych, compare Van der Velden, Cambyses
Reconsidered, supra note 73, with Van Miegroet, Justice ofCambyses, supra note 73.
78. WEALE, supra note 77, at 8-9, 13. David received payments in 1488, 1490, and "after arbitration
in 1498," an additional sum, totaling fourteen pounds, ten shillings. Id. at 13.
79. Figures 8 & 9, photographs of the David Cambyses, are reproduced with permission of the Musea
Brugge, Groeningemuseum. The original frames formed a single whole; each panel is five feet and eleven
inches by four feet and eight inches. In 1794, the panels were taken by the French and then returned in
1816 to the Town Hall before being relocated to the Museum of the Academy in 1828, where they were
restored. For a time, a copy (with variations, entitled Flaying of Sisamnes) hung, during the nineteenth
century, in the Law Courts of Bruges. WEALE, supra note 77, at 13 & n.1.
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"wearing a royal coronet in German fashion"so) accuses Sisamnes, who is
seated on his judicial, high-backed chair.
In the right-hand panel (Figure 9), the corrupt judge is being flayed alive.
(Reproductions cannot duplicate the experience of looking at the larger-than-
life, brilliantly colored original, offering gory details startling in their
specificity.) Toward the back, on the right side, is a smaller scene that
provides the denouement. The new judge-the son Otanes-is seated on his
father's skin, draped over the judge's bench.
Competing interpretations exist of both the Cambyses story and the
reasons for its placement in the 1498 City Hall of Bruges. Classical
historians identified Cambyses as a king gone mad-a monarch condemned
to a perpetual state of rage and drunkenness because, wrongly drawn into
war with Egypt, he had killed its sacred bull."' If the flaying of the judge
Sisamnes is put in the context of the other noxious acts attributed to
Cambyses, the story is about a crazy king using his power in gruesome
ways. 82
An alternative reading, however, and one that dominated the story's
deployment during the Medieval and Renaissance periods, was that
Cambyses was a king who wisely sanctioned an unjust judge. The scene-
set forth in town halls, on commemorative medals, tapestries, and
reproduced in prints-served regularly as an exemplum iustitiae, warning all
judges about how to behave appropriately. Portrayals of the Cambyses story
can be found in many town halls, including those of Mons, Gdafisk
(Danzig), and Brussels,83 along with other exempla to make the point that
rulers had the power "to guarantee the utter impartiality of the judgments
handed down."84
V. APPROPRIATING VIRTUE
We have traced some of the strands of the didacticism in the public
performance of justice and two of the narrative images that once were
common in places of judgment. Today's courtrooms no longer feature
such imagery. Instead, Justice has come to serve as a signpost for a
courthouse. Hence, a bit more of her pedigree is in order before pondering
80. vAN MIEGROET, GERARD DAVID, supra note 75, at 145.
81. HERODOTUS, supra note 74, bk. 3 at 95-97.
82. As one commentator noted, the Roman and Greek sources on this story provided an "acute
sense of the barbaric," such that one would feel the "harsh justice of antiquity." JULIAAN H.A.
RIDDER, GERECHTIGHEIDSTAFERELEN VOOR SCHEPENHUIZEN IN DE ZUIDELIJKE NEDERLANDEN IN DE
14DE, 15DE, EN 16TH DE EEUW 55-56 (1989).
83. See, e.g, Jerzy Miziolek, Exempla Iustitiae at Arthur's Court in the Context ofDutch and Flemish,
German, and Italian Art, in NETHERLANDISH ARTISTS IN GDAtSK IN THE TIME OF HANS VREDEMAN DE
VRIES 73, 77-78, 153 fig.9 (2006).
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the complexity of contemporary iterations.
The roots of the personification are traced to the Egyptian ideal Ma'at, a
concept that, as Manning explains, is linked to judgment and often shown
with the image of a balance.85 Because the "universal sense" of the term
Ma'at has no precise modern equivalent," Egyptologists offer several words
to capture what Ma 'at encompassed: "truth, justice, righteousness, order,
balance, and cosmic law,"" a "divine order,"88 a "stability,"89 and an
"evenness" 90 that stood in contrast to and overcame chaos. Depictions of
Ma 'at included a feather alone,91 with a pedestal or base denoting
foundational importance, 9 2 and a woman with an ostrich feather tucked
under a band on her head. At times that female (also called Ma'at) can be
seen holding a balance or, as in Figure 1093 (a fifteenth-century-B.C.E. detail
from one of hundreds of papyri sheets now called Egyptian Books of the
85. Manning, Representations ofJustice, supra note 37, at 114.
86. ERIK HORNUNG, IDEA INTO IMAGE: ESSAYS ON ANCIENT EGYPTIAN THOUGHT 136 (Elizabeth
Bredeck trans., 1992). He described the "Sanskrit word rta" as coming "closest." Id.
87. PINCH, supra note 74, at 159.
88. Id.at4,7.
89. JOYCE TYLDESLEY, JUDGEMENT OF THE PHARAOH: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ANCIENT EGYPT
18(2000).
90. HORNUNG, IDEA INTO IMAGE, supra note 86, at 139. Ma'at is regularly contrasted with injustice
and disorder. See SIEGFRIED MORENZ, EGYPTIAN RELIGION 110-36 (Ann E. Keep trans., 1973).
91. Erik Homung, Ancient Egyptian Religious Iconography, in CIVILIZATIONS OF THE ANCIENT
NEAR EAST 1711, 1721-25 (Jack M. Sasson ed., Miriam Lichtheim trans., 1995). As in other
iconographical traditions, an attribute associated with one figure could also be connected to another. For
example, in Egyptian imagery the feather also signified the air god Shu. PINCH, supra note 74, at 160.
92. HORNUNG, supra note 86, at 134.
93. Figure 10, copyrighted by the Trustees of the British Museum, is reproduced with their
permission. The papyrus from the Nedjmet Book of the Dead may have come from the Royal Cache at
Deir el-Bahari, Egypt; it is dated around 1070 B.C.E., the time of the Twenty-First Dynasty.
22
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol24/iss1/2
Resnik & Curtis
Dead94), she herself forms the centerpiece of the scales." An oft-repeated
explanation of the scene is that at death, a person's heart (said to direct a
person's will, feelings, thoughts, and character) was weighed against an
ostrich feather (representing Ma'at) to determine where that person would
go in the afterlife.96
Ma'at's female form served as a predecessor to a series of Greek and
Roman goddesses (Themis, Dike, and lustitia)," all justice-engaged and
linked to ruling powers. More than a dozen Roman emperors between the
first and fourth centuries C.E. broadcast their special relationship through
their coins. The ruler's representation was on one side and, on the other, a
figure of Justicia, sometimes standing, other times seated on a throne, and
holding various objects including a cornucopia, a sceptre, scales, and a
bundle of rods (fasces) emblematic of Roman government officials'
authority. Helen North explained that Dikaiosyn8/Justicia was the sole
classical Virtue with such a recognizable "type" in ancient art," and scholars
credit the Roman writer Aulus Gellius as the source for Medieval portrayals
of Justicia's "stem appearance and keen gaze.""
Moving forward in time, Justice imagery became entwined with the
Catholic Church which, unlike Jewish and Islamic traditions, regularly
deploys personifications. Female figures identified as Justice can be found in
Christian art from as early as the fifth century."oo Those stern-gazed women
did not, however, always come with scales. Rather, Medieval art frequently
affixed scales to another figure, the oft-winged male St. Michael who
94. The title Book of the Dead is a "term coined in the nineteenth century for a body of texts known to
the Ancient Egyptians as the Spells for Going Forth by Day." PINCH, supra note 74, at 26.
95. In some texts Ra, Ma at's father, is described as weighing Ma at. See MAULANA KARENGA,
MAAT, THE MORAL IDEAL IN ANCIENT EGYPT: A STUDY IN CLASSICAL AFRICAN ETHICS 64 (2004).
96. An excerpt from Spell 30b is:
0 my heart of my different ages! Do not stand up as a witness
against me, do not be opposed to me in the tribunal, do not be
hostile to me in the presence of the Keeper of the Balance ....
Do not tell lies about me in the presence of the god; ... Thus say
Thoth, judge of truth, . . . . Hear this word of very truth. I have
judged the heart of the deceased, and his soul stands as a witness
for him. His deeds are righteous in the great balance, and no sin
has been found in him.
THE EGYPTIAN BOOK OF THE DEAD, THE BOOK OF GOING FORTH BY DAY, BEING THE PAPYRUS OF ANI,
ROYAL SCRIBE OF THE DIVINE OFFERINGS OF ALL THE GODS, WRITTEN AND ILLUSTRATED CIRCA 1250
BCE, at text accompanying plate 3 (Raymond 0. Faulkner & Dr. Ogden Goelet Jr. trans., 1994).
97. See HELEN NORTH, FROM MYTH TO [CON: REFLECTIONS OF GREEK ETHICAL DOCTRINE IN
LITERATURE AND ART (1979); Dougal Blyth & Tom Stevenson, Personification in Greek Literature and
Art, in MEGAN JENKINSON, UNDER THE AEGIS: THE VIRTUES 117 (Peter Shand ed., 1997).
98. NORTH,supra note 97, at 178 n.3.
99. Michael Evans, Two Sources for Maimed Justice, in 11 SOURCE: NOTES IN THE HISTORY OF ART
12(1982).
100. See ADOLF KATZENELLENBOGEN, ALLEGORIES OF THE VIRTUES AND VICES IN MEDIEVAL ART
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functioned as a "psychopomp" leading souls to judgment."o' While the use
of scales (then often called a balance) to represent judgment is shared by
Babylonian, Egyptian, Greek, Roman, Jewish, and Christian texts and
imagery, St. Michael formed a bridge from Egyptian eschatology across
Christian imagery to the Renaissance Virtue Justice. 102 That relationship can
be seen by comparing Saint Michael Weighing a Soul, circa 1450 (Figure
11)103 with the Justicia (Justice) (Figure 12),' shown with her billowing
robes, scales, and sword in a mid-sixteenth century print by Cornelis Matsys.
We place Justice in another context in Figure 13, a collage of four
figures illustrating that she was once part of an assembly rather than a
solo actor."os For centuries, the foursome of Justice, Prudence, Fortitude,
and Temperance were known as the Cardinal Virtues.106 Derived from
discussions by Plato, Cicero, and St. Thomas Aquinas, 107 the set
sometimes appeared alongside the theological trio of Faith, Hope, and
Charity.'0o Those Virtues, in turn, overlapped with others, now less well
known, in depictions of an epic battle with Vices.
101. See Mary Phillips Perry, On the Psychostasis in Christian Art H1, 22 THE BURLINGTON MAG.
FOR CONNOISSEURS 208, 208 (1913).
102. S.G.F. BRANDON, THE JUDGMENT OF THE DEAD: AN HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF THE IDEA OF A POST-MORTEM JUDGMENT IN THE MAJOR RELIGIONS 45 (1967).
103. Figure I1, a Greco-Byzantine image, an oil on a panel, is reproduced courtesy of the Yale
Art Gallery (no. 1934.85, gift of Walter L. Ehrich, PH.B 1899). Our thanks to Kate Ezra, David Odo,
Elizabeth Grey, and David Wharples, for their help in identifying relevant images, mounting the
exhibit from Jan.-May of 2011 in the Yale Art Gallery, and facilitating the reproduction rights for this
image as well as for Figure 17 (Albrecht Dilrer, Sol lustitiae).
104. Figure 12, Justice, by Cornelis Matsys, circa 1543-1544, is reproduced courtesy of the
copyright holder, the Warburg Institute, University of London, and provided with the assistance of
Elizabeth McGrath.
105. Figure 13 is a composite of Justice, Cornelis Matsys, circa 1543-1544; Prudence, Agostino
Veneziano, 1516; Temperance, Agostino Veneziano, 1517; and Fortitude, Marcantonio Raimondi,
circa 1520. The images are reproduced courtesy of the copyright holder, the Warburg Institute,
University of London, and provided with the assistance of Elizabeth McGrath.
106. See generally KATZENELLENBOGEN, supra note 100; JENNIFER O'REILLY, STUDIES IN THE
ICONOGRAPHY OF THE VIRTUES AND VICES IN THE MIDDLE AGES 112 (1988); Selma Pfeiffenberger,
The Iconology of Giotto's Virtues and Vices at Padua (1966) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Bryn
Mawr College) (on file with author).
107. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC bk. iv, 427e, at 93 (G.M.A. Grube trans., 1974) (to be "wise,
brave, moderate, and just"); Cicero, De Natura Deorum, in 19 CICERO IN TWENTY-EIGHT VOLUMES,
at xiii, xviii (Harris Rackham trans., 1979). Platonic virtues became a part of Christian thought during
the fourth century via the work of St. Ambrose, and then through Isidor of Seville, Rabanus Maurus,
Peter Lombard, to Thomas Aquinas and into many works of art. See EMILE MALE, THE GOTHIC
IMAGE: RELIGIOUS ART IN FRANCE OF THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY 110 n.4 (Dora Nussey trans.,
1958). Another thirteenth-century source is the Somme le Roi (often translated as The Book of Vices
and Virtues but literally "Summation for the King"). See ROSEMOND TUVE, ALLEGORICAL IMAGERY:
SOME MEDIAEVAL BOOKS AND THEIR POSTERITY 57-143 (1966); Rosemond Tuve, Notes on the
Virtues and Vices, Part 1, 26 J. WARBURG & COURTAULD INST. 264 (1963); Rosemond Tuve, Notes
on the Virtues and Vices, Part 2, 27 J. WARBURG & COURTAULD INST. 42 (1964).
108. 1 Corinthians, the source cited for the three theological Virtues, can be translated as: "And
now abideth faith, hope, charitie, these three, but the greatest of these is charitie." See I Corinthians
13:13 (King James). A more recent translation presents them as "faith, hope, and love," with the
"greatest of them all" as love. See I Corinthians 13:13.
24




lusticia (Justice), Cornelis Matsys,
circa 1543-1544.
Copyright: Warburg Institute, University of London.
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Figure 11.
Saint Michael Weighing the Soul.
Reproduced courtesy of the Yale University Art
3allery. Gift of Walter L. Ehrich, Ph.B 1899.
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Figure 13. Top, left to right: lusticia (Justice), Cornelis Matsys, circa 1543-1544;
Prudence, Agostino Veneziano, 1516. Bottom, left to right: Temperance, Agostino
Veneziano, 1517; Fortitudo (Fortitude), Marcantonio Raimondi, circa 1520.
Copyright: Warburg Institute, University of London.
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Called the Psychomachia after a famous fifth-century allegorical poem by
Prudentius describing Christianity's triumph over paganism, the conflict
enacted the moral struggle for a person's soul, as seven Virtues were
pitted against a symmetric group of seven Vices.109
Virtues typically took the female form-reflecting their relation to
Egyptian, Greek, and Roman goddesses," 0 as well as the feminine gender
of the Latin nouns that they represented."' By the late Middle Ages,
artists had come to use the male form for certain Vices.112 How and why
words, activities, or abstractions came to be gendered is a topic explored
in feminist and in critical theory, for the iconography reflected, produced,
and codified sex-role divisions, encoded in various myths."13
In practice, which Virtues and Vices were in combat varied in numbers
and names,114 and Justice was not regularly portrayed in the conflict until
the twelfth century.I"s By the late Medieval period, Church leaders were
using these images to school a wide and diverse audience on the moral
and religious obligations embodied in various Virtues-Hope, Faith,
Charity, Prudence, Temperance, and Fortitude, as well as Justice. Those
109. The Psychomachia, dating from around 405 C.E., became a popular text during the Middle
Ages. Prudentius's invention, to name and personify the Virtues and Vices, replaced abstractions with
combatants in conflict, offering the "first sustained personification allegory," with a revolutionary
impact. See MACKLIN SMITH, PRUDENTIUS' "PSYCHOMACHIA": A REEXAMINATION 3-6 (1976); see
also S. GEORGIA NUGENT, ALLEGORY AND POETICS: THE STRUCTURE AND IMAGERY OF
PRUDENTIUS' "PSYCHOMACHIA" 7-16 (1985).
110. Blyth & Stevenson, supra note 97, at 117-124.
111. See MARINA WARNER, MONUMENTS & MAIDENS: THE ALLEGORY OF THE FEMALE FORM,
at xxi, 63-76, 152-54 (1985).
112. In the Prudentius verse, both Virtues and Vices were female. One oft-cited example of the
female-male contrast is Giotto's Virtues and Vices (1305-06) in the Padua Chapel where Folly,
Injustice, and Infidelity were given male form. See Bruce Cole, Virtues and Vices in Giotto's Arena
Chapel Frescoes, in THE ARENA CHAPEL AND THE GENIUS OF GIOTTO 369-94 (1998).
113. The gendering of allegorical figures was not random. In twelfth-century churches, the Vice
Unchastity is a female in hell-usually shown in a revolting posture, her naked body entwined by
serpents, which feed on her breasts and sexual organs. Sometimes, too, she is accompanied by the
Devil, who assumes an intimate relationship with her. The "typical 'male' Vice, on the other hand is
either Pride or Avarice, the former denoting the chief failing of the feudal nobles, the latter that of the
middle class." Henry Kraus, Eve and Mary: Conflicting Images of Medieval Woman, in FEMINISM
AND ART HISTORY: QUESTIONING THE LITANY 77, 81 (Norma Broude & Mary D. Garrard eds.,
1982); see also EMMA STAFFORD, WORSHIPING VIRTUES: PERSONIFICATION AND THE DIVINE IN
ANCIENT GREECE 27-35 (2000); Carol J. Clover, Regardless of Sex: Men, Women, and Power in
Early Northern Europe, 68 SPECULUM 363, 366-68, 380 (1993); Jacques de Ville, Mythology and the
Images ofJustice, 23 LAW & LITERATURE 324 (2011).
114. See ORTON W. BLOOMFIELD, THE SEVEN DEADLY SINS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
HISTORY OF A RELIGIOUS CONCEPT, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO MEDIEVAL ENGLISH LITERATURE
65 (1952); ERWIN PANOFSKY, STUDIES IN ICONOLOGY: HUMANISTIC THEMES IN THE ART OF THE
RENAISSANCE 224 (1962). The Index of Christian Art listed 227 different images, including 109
Virtues, arranged from Abstinence to Wisdom, as well as 118 Vices. See Virtue & Vice: The
Personifications, in 2 INDEX OF CHRISTIAN ART 241-49 (2000) (listing images of Justice).
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terms, their personifications, and import formed a "common currency."
A. From Ostriches to Eyes: The Attributes ofJustice
As Figure 13 illustrates, Virtues were identified through attributes as
well as explained in texts addressing their interdependencies, hierarchies,
and distinctions. The depictions varied by period, place, and artistic
impulse, such that any particular Virtue can be found with an odd lot of
attributes. Justice, for example, held cornucopias, lictor rods, orbs, books,
and tablets and appeared with a mix of animals and birds including dogs,
snakes, ostriches, and cranes.
Over time, certain accoutrements came to dominate, as the figures in
Figure 13 also illustrate. Prudence and Temperance are drawn from a
well-known series painted by Raphael for a room in the Vatican's Stanza
della Segnatura."' The 1516 print by Veneziano shows Prudence with a
mirror,' as well as sporting a second face (that of a bearded old man) at
the back of her head. Explanations were that the retrospective glance
captured Prudence's ability to comprehend the past while the mirror
permitted contemplation-all required for the introspection entailed in the
practical wisdom which Prudence embodied." 9 Veneziano's Temperance
has a bridle, one of her stock attributes used to symbolize self-restraint.'2 0
116. O'REILLY, supra note 106, at 92.
117. Veneziano's drawings of Prudence and Temperance are after Raphael's frescoes in the
Stanza della Segnatura, named for the Pope's "Segnatura Gratiae et Iustitiae" (the Signature of
Grace and Justice), the Highest Court of the Holy See, which met there during the sixteenth century.
See CHRISTIANE L. JOOST-GAUGIER, RAPHAEL'S STANZA DELLA SEGNATURA: MEANING AND
INVENTION (2002). Pope Julius II, who held office from 1503 to 1513, used the room as a library and
private office. Edgar Wind suggested that Raphael's Prudence, Temperance, and Fortitude were
doubled, simultaneously referencing both a Cardinal and a Theological Virtue. See Edgar Wind,
Platonic Justice, Designed by Raphael, I J. WARBURG & COURTAULD INST. 69 (1937). Joost-Gaugier
disagreed, identifying them as the Three Graces, referring to the three daughters of Zeus (Justice,
Peace, and Lawfulness), linking the "(Greek) Graces, the (Roman) Justinian, and the (Christian)
Gregory" to portray a "grandiose concordance or harmony of Greek law, Roman law, and Christian
law." JOOST-GAUGIER, supra, at 146. Our discussion uses the images to illustrate depictions of the
Cardinal Virtues.
118. Veneziano (Agostino dei Musi) was born in Venice around 1490 and died in Rome,
sometime after 1536. From 1514 to 1536, he worked with Marcantonio Raimondi (whose Fortitude is
also depicted in this collage). See THE ENGRAVINGS OF MARCANTONIO RAIMONDI, at xv (1981). The
drawings of Prudence and Temperance, both marked AV for Veneziano, are catalogued in 27 THE
ILLUSTRATED BARTSCH: THE WORKS OF MARCANTONIO RAIMONDI AND OF His SCHOOL 53 (1978).
Raphael may have modeled the original fresco after Giotto's Prudence in that both are Janus-faced,
with a female figure on one side and a bearded man at the back. Further, some credit Giotto as the
first to associate the mirror with Prudence. See Pfeiffenberger, supra note 106, at ch. 5. Mirrors, like
other objects connected to various Virtues, had multiple meanings. When attached to the Virgin Mary,
Humility, Charity, or Faith, the mirror was explained as indicative of divine insight or purity. When
Prudence looked in the mirror, some read it as a "symbol of the Socratic nosce te ipsum" (know
thyself). See ART TREASURES OF THE VATICAN: ARCHITECTURE, PAINTING, SCULPTURE 22 (1975).
119. See Quentin Skinner, Ambrogio Lorenzetti: The Artist as Political Philosopher, 72
PROCEEDINGS BRITISH ACAD. 48 (1986).
120. HELEN L. NORTH, SOPHROSYNE: SELF-KNOWLEDGE AND SELF-RESTRAINT IN GREEK
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Fortitude, from around the same period and attributed to Marcantonio
Raimondi,12 1 wears a helmet with a small lion perched on top and holds a
broken column-all references to power, endurance, and strength. 22
One did not need to travel to Rome to see such displays. Joining an
array of other images, the Virtues were catalogued and popularized in the
compendia of graphic allegories and emblems produced during the
sixteenth century by Andreas Alciatus in his 1531 Index Emblematicus23
and by Cesare Ripa in his 1593 Iconologia.'24 Along with a few books on
LITERATURE 13 (1966). Cesare Ripa explained that the "personification of Temperance is a woman. .
. who holds a bridle .... As a bridle restrains a horse, so does temperance hold appetites in check."
See CESARE RIPA, BAROQUE AND Rococo PICTORIAL IMAGERY: THE 1758-1768 HERTEL EDITION OF
RIPA'S "ICONOLOGIA" WITH 200 ENGRAVED ILLUSTRATIONS 149 (Edward A. Maser ed., 1971)
[hereinafter RIPA, MASTER EDITON]. In works from fourteenth-century Tuscany, Temperance was
shown with a vessel as if pouring liquid, or with an hourglass, both said to express moderation.
Skinner, supra note 119, at 49.
121. Marcantonio Raimondi (c. 1480-1534) was an important source for the dissemination of
Raphael's designs. See LISA PON, RAPHAEL, DORER & MARCANTONIO RAIMONDI: COPYING AND THE
ITALIAN RENAISSANCE PRINT (2004); Elizabeth Broun, The Portable Raphael, in THE ENGRAVINGS
OF MARCANTONIO RAIMONDI 20-42 (1981); Lisa Pon, Marcantonio Printmaking/Printing
Marcantonio, in CHANGING IMPRESSIONS: MARCANTONIO RAIMONDI & SIXTEENTH-CENTURY PRINT
CONNOISSEURSHIP 60-71 (1999). The image shown in Figure 13 is indexed in J.D. PASSAVANT, 6 LE
PEINTRE-GRAVEUR 87, no. 99-015 (1864). The print can also be found in MADELINE CIRILLO
ARCHER, THE ILLUSTRATED BARTSCH: THE ITALIAN MASTERS OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 64, no.
2801.083 (1995).
122. Fortitude's attributes include a lion, sometimes shown "trampled underfoot" or with "its
jaws . . . wrenched open in Herculean fashion;" alternately, a lion's skin is "worn as a trophy" or
displayed on a medallion or shield. O'REILLY, supra note 106, at 198. Fortitude, also discussed (pace
Plato) as courage is often shown with a broken column or a tower to evoke strength. See Skinner,
supra note 119, at 51. See generally WILLIAM IAN MILLER, THE MYSTERY OF COURAGE (2000).
123. Andreas Alciatus (or Andrea Alciato or Alciun or Alciati) was bom in Italy and was a
professor of Roman law who taught at Bourges, France from 1529 to 1533 and later at Pavia and
Bologna, Italy. Alciatus's emblem treatise, a diverse collection of moralizing short poems, epigrams,
and illustrations, was first published in 1531 and thereafter in some 150 editions. See 1-2 ANDREAS
ALCIATUS, THE LATIN EMBLEMS: INDEX EMBLEMATICUS (Peter M. Daly ed., 1985) (unpaginated
edition with numbered emblems).
124. Cesare Ripa, whose original name was Giovanni Campani, was born in Perugia around
1560. Although known today for its illustrations, the first edition of Ripa's Iconologia was published
without pictures in Rome in 1593; Ripa did not likely have direct involvement in the drawings in
subsequent editions. See Stefano Pierguidi, Giovanni Guerra and the Illustrations of Ripa s Iconologia,
61 J. WARBURG & COURTAULD INST. 158, 167, 174-75 (1998). The first illustrated "Ripa" was
published in 1603, followed by more than forty editions in eight languages, many of which were
selective renditions or extrapolations. Ripa's centrality to twentieth-century iconography comes
through the work of Mile, Erwin Panofsky, and Gombrich. See ERNST GOMBRICH, SYMBOLIC
IMAGES: STUDIES IN THE ART OF THE RENAISSANCE (1978); ERWIN PANOFSKY, MEANING IN VISUAL
ARTS (1955); Ernst Gombrich, Icones Symbolicae: The Visual Image in Neo-Platonic Thought, II J.
WARBURG & COURTAULD INST. 163, 183 (1948). Access to the various compilations is facilitated by
YASSU OKAYAMA, THE RIPA INDEX: PERSONIFICATIONS AND THEIR ATTRIBUTES IN FIVE EDITIONS
OF THE ICONOLOGIA (1992).
In our discussions, we rely on CESARE RIPA, ICONOLOGIA (New York, Garland Publ'g Co. 1976)
(Padua, Italy, Pietro Paolo Tozzi 1611) [hereinafter RIPA, PADUA-1611]; 1-2 CESARE RIPA, ICONOLOGIA
(Torino, Italy, F6gola Editore 1988) (Padua, Italy, Pietro Paolo Tozzi 1618) [hereinafter RIPA, PADUA-
1618]; CESARE RIPA, ICONOLOGIE (New York, Garland Publ'g Co. 1976) (1. Baudoin ed., Paris, Chez
Mathieu Guillemot 1644) [hereinafter FRENCH RIPA-1644]; CESARE RIPA, ICONOLOGIA (Soest, Davaco
1971) (Amsterdam, Dirck Pietersz Pers 1644) [hereinafter DUTCH RIPA-1644]; RIPA, MASER EDITION,
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Egyptian hieroglyphs (published between 1499 and 1505),125 these texts
standardized a lexicon for artists and viewers. Their works were
illustrated, embellished, and widely reproduced as printing presses
permitted multiple editions and extrapolations in various languages.
Through didactic and repetitive invocations in art and literature, on tarot
cards, in the designs for the coats of arms of burgher states and ruling
families in middle Europe, and in political and theological theorizing,
Ripa's Virtues and Alciatus's emblems provided a common set of
references across a broad geographical span for some two hundred years.
Justice imagery was then more wide-ranging than the reduction that is
commonplace today. In a version of Ripa published in 1611 in Padua,
seven Justices are described-a Divine Justice ("Giustitia Divina") and six
variations on "Worldly Justices" 126 -JUStice ("Giustitia"), Justice According
to Aulus Gellius ("Giustitia . . . che riferisce Aulo Gellio"), Principled (or
Strict) Justice ("Giustitia retta"), Rigorous Justice ("Giustitia rigorosa"),
Justice of Pausanius in the Eliaci ("Giustitia di Pausania ne gl'Eliaci"), and
Justice on the medals of Hadrian, Antoninus Pius, and Alexander ("Giustitia
delle Medaglie d'Adriano, d'Antonio Pio, & d'Alessandro").12 7 A 1644
supra note 120; 1-2 CESARE RIPA, ICONOLOGY (New York, Garland Publ'g Co. 1976) (George
Richardson ed., London, G. Scott 1779) [hereinafter RIPA, RICHARDSON EDITION]. Translations of the
French and Italian are by Allison Tait.
The Richardson edition was the "very last iconology in the tradition of Ripa." See Thomas Froschl,
Republican Virtues and the Free State: Conceptual Frame and Meaning in Early Modern Europe and
North America, in ICONOGRAPHY, PROPAGANDA, AND LEGITIMATION 255, 263 (1998). While continuing
to evoke "divine secrets or hidden realities," emblems' allegorical emphasis was moving to accommodate
demands for "reason and commonsense." See MICHAEL BATH, SPEAKING PICTURES: ENGLISH EMBLEM
BOOKS AND RENAISSANCE CULTURE 261 (1994).
125. See ALISON SAUNDERS, THE SIXTEENTH-CENTURY FRENCH EMBLEM BOOK: A
DECORATIVE AND USEFUL GENRE 5-6, 71-95 (1988).
126. Erwin Panofsky, Blind Cupid, in STUDIES IN ICONOLOGY: HUMANISTIC THEMES IN THE ART OF
THE RENAISSANCE 109 n.48 (1962).
127. RIPA, PADUA-1611, supra note 124, at 201-04. Two of those descriptions, of "Justice
According to Aulus Gellius" and of "Justice," are detailed hereafter; this note discusses the remaining
five. "Justice of Pausanias," referencing the Greek traveler and geographer Pausanius of the second
century C.E., became famous in the Renaissance through his Description of Greece. Ripa called for:
A woman of beautiful bearing, richly adorned, who with her left
hand clutches an old, ugly woman and beats her with a stick. And
this old woman, called Pausania, represents injury, from which just
judges must always be kept, such that the truth is not hidden from
them and they are able to listen patiently to each person's defense.
Id. at 202.
A second, "Principled Justice" or "Strict Justice," was to be:
A woman with a raised sword, regal crown, and scales; on one side
of her, there is a dog signifying friendship and a serpent on the
other signifying hate. The raised sword denotes that Justice should
not bend to either side, neither for friendship nor for hatred of any
person....
Id. at 203-204.
The third, "Rigorous Justice," was:
A skeletal figure like that used to depict death, in a white robe ...
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Paris edition showed four illustrations-of Justice, Justice Inviolable, Justice
Rigoureus, and Justice Divine (Figure 14). 128 All are garbed in robes; two of
the four have scales and sword, a third holds scales and an orb, and one is
shown without objects in hand.
we can see her face, feet and hands with a bared sword and scales.
. . .This figure teaches us that rigorous justice does not pardon any
crime, no matter the excuse given . . . just like death, who is not
touched by excuses and who has no regard for the station or quality
of the person... . The fearsome aspect of this figure demonstrates
that this sort of Justice is frightening to the people and that there is
no occasion for the law to be interpreted lightly.
Id. at 204.
A fourth was "Justice on the medals of Hadrian, Antoninus Pius and Alexander." Hadrian was
the Emperor of Rome from 117 CE to 138 C.E., succeeded by Antoninus Pius, who served from
138 to 161 CE. Alexander the Great was the Greek king of Macedonia who ruled from 336 to 323
B.C.E. and conquered a large swath of the European and Asian continents. This Justice was:
A seated woman wearing a bracelet and holding a scepter in one
hand and a chalice in the other. She is seated because it befits the
gravity of a wise person and it is for this reason that judges render
decisions while seated.
Id. at 203.
A fifth, the only one deemed "Divine," was:
A woman of singular beauty, dressed in gold and with a gold
crown on her head, above which a dove is circling; she has hair
scattered across her shoulders with eyes upturned, looking away
from low concerns, and is holding in her right hand an unsheathed
sword and scales in the left. There is every reason to portray this
figure as exceedingly beautiful because she is a part of the divine
being . .. that is all perfection and beauty. She is dressed in gold to
demonstrate, through the nobility and splendor of this metal, the
excellence and sublime nature of Justice. The crown of gold is to
show that she has power over all other earthly powers. The balance
indicates that divine Justice regulates all actions just as the sword
signifies the punishment of criminals. The dove signifies the Holy
Ghost, third member of the Holy Trinity ....
Id. at 202-03.
The Dutch edition from 1644 provides the same list of seven as did the 1611 Padua edition. The seven
Justices did not, however, reappear in all Ripa editions. In RIPA, PADUA- 1618, supra note 124, for
example, only two ("Justice According to Aulus Gellius" and "Justice") are mentioned. Moreover,
slightly different descriptions can be found. By the 1758 Hertel edition, Justice is reduced to one image,
and she is shown "blindfolded, for nothing but pure reason, not the often misleading evidence of the
senses, should be used in making judgments." RIPA, MASER EDITION, supra note 120, at 120. Richardson's
1779 edition retained the blindfold and noted, "She is sitting with a bandage over her eyes. The white robes
and bandage over her eyes, allude to incorrupt justice, disregarding every interested view, by distributing
of justice with rectitude and purity of mind, and protecting the innocent." 2 RIPA, RICHARDSON EDITION,
supra note 124, at 21.
128. Our thanks to Mike Widener, Rare Book Room librarian in the Lillian Goldman Law
Library, for assistance in reproducing this image, from Cesare Ripa's Iconologie (1644). This image
can also be found in Judith Resnik, Dennis Curtis, Allison Tait & Mike Widener, The Remarkable
Run of a Political Icon: Justice as a Sign of the Law, on display in the Rare Book Exhibition Gallery
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Moreover, and unlike the Melbourne 2002 version (Figure 1), all are
clear-sighted. Ripa's Justice According to Aulus Gellius (Figure 15)129 had
"acute vision" and "piercing eyes,"l30 as well as a necklace on which
129. Gellius was a Latin grammarian of the second century C.E. who authored Noctes atticae
(Attic Nights). Gellius's description-"luminibus oculorum acribus"--was translated by Theodore
Ziolkowski as a "piercing gaze" and, he argued, congruent with a line from an Athenian author, Menander,
who ascribed to Dike an "eye that sees everything." See THEODORE ZIOLKOWSKI, THE MIRROR OF
JUSTICE: LITERARY REFLECTIONS OF LEGAL CRISES 99, 106 (1997).
Figure 15 is from Ripa's Della Novissimi lconologie, published in 1625 in Padua, and provided,
courtesy of the Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, with the assistance of Mike Widener; it
is also available on the web-based display, Resnik et al., supra note 128. One detailed description
comes from RIPA, PADUA-1611, supra note 124, also illustrating "Justice According to Aulus
Gellius." Ripa instructed that she should be:
A woman who is a beautiful virgin, crowned and dressed in gold
who, with honesty and discipline, shows herself worthy of
reverence, with eyes of the most acute vision and a necklace
around her throat that is decorated with an eye. Plato said that
Justice sees all and that from ancient times priests were called
seers of all things. From whence Apuleius swore by the eye of the
Sun and Justice together to show that one is as insightful as the
other . . . [and they are] qualities that ministers of Justice must
have, because they must also be able to discover truth and, in the
manner of virgins, must be exempt from passion, not . .. corrupted
by flattery, gifts, or anything else . . . . To indicate Justice and
intellectual integrity the ancients used a jug, a basin, a column-as
is verified on old marble sepulchers and by diverse antiquities,
such that Alciatus said: A good judge must be pure of soul and
clean of hands, if he wishes to punish crime and avenge injury.
Id. at 201-02. Note what was not mentioned-scales, sword, or other implements or animals.
130. RIPA, PADUA-161 1, supra note 124, at 201; see also I RIPA, PADUA-1618, supra note 124, at
188; Theodore Ziolkowski, The Figure ofJustice in Western Art and Literature, 75 INMUNKWAHAK: J.
HUMAN. 187, 199 (1996).
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"an eye is portrayed" because "Plato said that Justice sees all and that, from
ancient times, priests were called seers of all things."1 31 Ripa posited that
only one of his seven "Justices" was to sport a blindfold, as well as many
other attributes, including an ostrich. A 1611 Padua edition explained:
A woman dressed in white with bandaged eyes; in her right hand
she holds a bundle of rods, with an axe, and in her left hand a fiery
flame, together with these things she has an ostrich at her side, and
holds a sword and scales.
This is the type of Justice that is exercised in the Tribunal of
judges and secular executors.
She is wearing white because judges should be without the stain
of personal interest or of any other passion that might pervert Justice,
and this is also why her eyes are bandaged-and thus she cannot see
anything that might cause her to judge in a manner that is against
reason. The bundle of rods with the axe, used in ancient times in
Rome to show . . . that justice must not be remiss in punishing
wrongdoing but that justice must also not be precipitous ...
The ostrich teaches us that the things that come before justice,
however intricate they may seem, must be tirelessly unraveled with a
patient spirit, as the ostrich digests iron, that most durable material,
as many authors recount.13 2
Ripa was not the first to put an ostrich on Justice, as a return to the
Vatican murals of the early 1500s makes plain. In addition to the Virtues
that Raphael painted for the Stanza della Segnatura that we showed
above, Giulio Romano provided a large-scale Justice (Figure 16), 13
holding scales and an ostrich for the Sala di Costantino (Room of
Constantine). Another well-known example is Luca Giordano's 1670
Allegoria della Guistizia oppressa, "Justice Disarmed."' 34
Scholars have various explanations for why an ostrich, seen in other
renditions, was once a plausible attribute for Justice.' One possible source
is the Egyptian Ma'at (Figure 10) who, as noted, was sometimes represented
by an ostrich feather' 36 or holding or forming scales on which a feather was
131. RIPA,PADUA-1611, supra note 124, at 201.
132. This passage can be found in both the 1611, id. at 203, and the 1618, RIPA, PADUA-1618, supra
note 124, at 188, editions from Padua under the description of Justice ("Giustitia").
133. Figure 16 is provided courtesy of the Library of Congress. Romano, who lived from 1499 to
1546 and was Raphael's student, was born in Rome. See FREDERICK HARTr, GIuLIo ROMANO (1958);
Frederick Hartt, Raphael and Giulio Romano: With Notes on the Raphael School, 26 ART BuLL. 67, 80
(1944).
134. See RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 2, at 78 fig.57.
135. See Liana de Girolami Cheney, Giorgio Vasari's Astraea: A Symbol of Justice, 19 VISUAL
REsouRcEs 283,290 (2003).
136. PINcH,supra note 74, at 159-60.
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weighted against an individual's heart.' Another connection comes from
Christianity. Medieval texts mention ostrich eggs hanging from church
vaults,33 and Medieval lore posited that ostriches deserted their eggs, which
hatched instead through the warmth of the sun. An aphorism attributed to
Albertus Magnus proffered the link-that, if "the sun can hatch the eggs of
the ostrich, why cannot a virgin conceive with the aid of the true sun?"'
Under this line of interpretation, Guilio Romano's Vatican Justice has scales
to represent the exacting nature of Justice and the bird to reference Christ's
origins. Moving from theology to political economy, another explanation for
the ostrich is that the powerful family of the Medicis used a diamond ring
with three ostrich feathers, explained as demonstrating that the "bearer is
eternally just, since ostrich feathers (believed all to be the same length)
symbolized Justice."' 4 0
The ostrich is long gone as a sign of Justice, and the "fiery flame" and
bundle of rods and axe (the fasces), which Ripa also commended, are
uncommonly seen. But a "bandage" over the eyes (today's blindfold),
which Ripa proposed be worn by only one of his seven Justices, has
become familiar-as illustrated by the opening images of the Melbourne
Lady of Justice (Figure 1), the 1961 Justice in front of Brazil's Supreme
Federal Tribunal (Figure 3), and the 2002 Lady Justice Lucy (Figure 6).
While valorized today, the blindfold (as well as blindness) was, in
earlier centuries, wholly negative. In Mesopotamia and Egypt, sun gods-
the sources of light that enabled sight-were gods of justice.' 4 ' Thereafter,
the Greeks and Romans put a representation of the sun at the center of their
zodiacs. Christianity embraced "sol Iustitiae"-Christ-as the God of Light,
who will "appear ablaze when he will judge mankind." 42 Albrecht Direr's
rendition (Figure 17), circa 1499, puts scales and sword on the wide-eyed
and haloed Christ-Justice, perched on a lion.143
137. Virpi Haiju, The Artistic Faces of Justice, in OlKEUDEN KUVA: BILDEN AV RATTEN OCH
RATTVISAN 284 (2000) (translation provided by Kirsti Langbein).
138. See Creighton Gilbert, "The Egg Reopened" Again, 56 ART BULL. 252, 253 (1974); Millard
Meiss, Ovum Struthionis, in STUDIES IN ART AND LITERATURE FOR BELLE DA COSTA GREENE 95
(Dorothy Miner ed., 1954).
139. Meiss, supra note 138, at 95 (discussing an egg in Mantegna's San Zeno altarpiece).
140. Francis Ames-Lewis, Early Medicean Devices, 42 J. WARBURG & COURTAULD INST. 122, 127-
29 (1979). The three feathers, said to represent the three Theological Virtues of Faith, Hope, and Charity,
were argued by others to come from a "moulting falcon," a symbol of the faithful. Id. at 129.
141. Egyptian ideology conceived of the "solar eye," or "Eye of Ra," and spoke of Ra as the "creator
sun god." See PINCH, supra note 74, at 19, 68-69. The eye of Horus, or udjat eye, was described as sharing
a significance represented by Ma 'at, "that justice and harmony ruled once more." See ERIK HORNUNG,
IDEA INTO IMAGE: ESSAYS ON ANCIENT EGYPTIAN THOUGHT 142-43 (Elizabeth Bredeck trans., 1992).
142. See THE COMPLETE ENGRAVINGS, ETCHINGS AND DRYPOINTS OF ALBRECHT DORER 52, no. 25,
Sol Justitiae, or The Judge (Walter L. Strauss ed., 1972).
143. The photograph of the engraving in Figure 17, from the Fritz Achelis Memorial Collection
and a gift of Frederic George Achelis, B.A. 1907, No. 1925.23, comes from the Yale University Art
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Figure 17. Sol Iustitiae, Albrecht Direr, 1499-1500.
Provided and reproduced with the permission of the Fritz Achelis Memorial Collection, Yale University Art
Gallery. Gift of Frederic George Achelis, B.A. 1907, No. 1925.23.
Such imagery is predicated on classical and biblical texts that repeatedly
cast light as representing truth and darkness as misguidedness. In both the
Hebrew Bible and the New Testament, blindness precluded a person's entry
into holy areas. Likewise, blind animals could not be offered to the gods.'"
To be struck blind'4 5 was, in turn, a form of punishment imposed by God.
144. Leviticus 21:18 ("No man with a defect shall come, whether a blind man, a lame man, a man
stunted or overgrown."); Leviticus 22:22 ("You shall present to the Lord nothing blind, disabled, mutilated,
with running sore, scab, or eruption, nor set any such creature on the altar as a food-offering to the
Lord.").
145. Job 11:20 ("Blindness will fall on the wicked.")
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Moreover, when humans punished each other, they sometimes put blindfolds
on their victims. Jesus himself was made sport of by being blindfolded,
mocked, and beaten.'4 6
As for the relationship between judgment and sight, according to Exodus,
"bribery makes the discerning man blind and the just man give a crooked
answer."l 47 Job reads: "The land is given over to the power of the wicked,
and the eyes of its judges are blindfolded."' 4 8 Isaiah proclaims: "The
prophets should be the eyes of the people, but God has blindfolded them." 4 9
These biblical lessons became fixtures in Medieval and Renaissance
literature and art, which reiterated that bandaged, covered, or blindfolded
eyes-as well as those who were physically blind-signified profound
limitations.
Exceptions exist. Sightless seers dot Greek epics,1"o and both Homer and
Milton provide conspicuous examples of visionaries whose insights came
from sources other than their eyes.'"' Not only was the "bard ... expected to
be blind,"' 52 but a few literary figures were ennobled by or compensated for
their blindness.
Yet the dominant motif was that "blindness is indissolubly linked with
distress."' That point was vividly made by two familiar fixtures in
Medieval Europe, Synagoga and Ecclesia, found "on ivory tablets, in
stained-glass windows, on church implements, in manuscript miniatures, and
in monumental statuary," 5 4 and readily comprehensible to all, "whether
educated or illiterate."' 5 Synagoga, "a purely Christian creation," was
deployed to signify the Old Testament and, sometimes, Jews in general. 5 6
146. Mark 14:65 ("Some began to spit on him, blindfolded him, and struck him with their fists."). In
earlier translations the phrase "cover his face" was used in lieu of the word blindfold. See also Luke 22:63
("They beat him, they blindfolded him, and they kept asking him, 'Now, prophet, who hit you?').
147. Exocus 23:8.
148. Job 9:24. In older translations available online, including the King James, Geneva, Rheims
Douai, and others, the translation was "covereth the face."
149. Isaiah 29:10 (The Good News Bible with Deuterocanonicals/Apocrypha, Today's English
Version). Again, the term was translated in earlier versions as "hath he covered."
150. See WILLIAM R. PAULSON, ENLIGHTENMENT, ROMANTICISM, AND THE BLIND IN FRANCE 1-9
(1987).
151. Natalie Kononenko-Moyle, Homer, Milton, and Aik Veysel: The Legend of the Blind Bard, 3-4
HARv. UKRAINIAN STUD. 521, 521 (1979-80).
152. See MOSHE BARASCH, BLINDNESS: THE HISTORY OF A MENTAL IMAGE IN WESTERN ART 28-29
(2001); Kononenko-Moyle, supra note 151, at 521. "On His Blindness" reflected on the role that the loss
of sight played in bending his "soul" to serve his "maker." See JOHN MILTON, Sonnet XVI, in COMPLETE
SHORTER POEMS 327-28 (John Carey ed., 1971).
153. BARASCH,supra note 152, at 83.
154. WOLFGANG S. SEIFERTH, SYNAGOGUE AND CHURCH IN THE MIDDLE AGES: TWO SYMBOLS IN
ART AND LITERATURE 96 (Lee Chadeayne & Paul Gottwald trans., 1970).
155. BARASCH,supra note 152, at 84.
156. MICHAEL CAMILLE, THE GOTHIC IDOL: IDEOLOGY AND IMAGE-MAKING IN MEDIEVAL ART 178
(1991). The name has various spellings, including Synagogue, Sinagogue, and others. Some depictions of
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Ecclesia stood for the New Testament and, at times, Christianity.
The pair shown in Figure 18, crafted around 1230, remains in place on the
south portal of the Strasbourg Cathedral,"' near two areas (outside and
indoors) that served in the thirteenth century "as courts of law," where
marriages were ceremonialized, municipal laws determined, oaths taken, and
tributes given.' Unlike that ramrod-straight, crowned, sharp-eyed, regal
woman (Ecclesia, the "bride of Christ"), Synagoga is slumped and her rod
broken. Her eyes are covered by a blindfold that was her "principal motif,"
demonstrating that she was blind to the "light" of Christianity.'59
Blindfolded, not blind, was the point, for the willful refusal to comprehend
Figure 18. Personification of Ecclesia (left) and Synagoga (right), Strasbourg
Cathedral, Strasbourg, France. Photographer: Rama, Dec. 15, 2006.
Reproduced with the permission of the photographer via Wikimedia Commons.
See Sara Lipton, The Root ofAll Evil: Jews, Money and Metaphor in the Bible Moralishe, I MEDIEVAL
ENCOUNTERS 301-22 (1995).
157. The two are "perhaps the most celebrated exemplars of their genre." See Nina Rowe,
Idealization and Subjection at the South Portal ofStrasbourg Cathedral, in BEYOND THE YELLOW BADGE:
ANTI-JUDAISM AND ANTISEMITISM IN MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN VISUAL CULTURE 179 (Mitchell
B. Merback ed., 2008).
158. Bernd Nicolai, Orders in Stone: Social Reality and Artistic Approach; The Case of the
Strasbourg South Portal, 41 GESTA 11l, 112-13 (2002). Comparable sets of Ecclesia and Synagoga-in
stone or on stained glass-from roughly the same period can be found at the Cathedrals of Rheims and of
Bordeaux in France, as well in several German cathedrals, including in Bamberg, Magdeburg, and Worms,
and in England at Lincoln, Salisbury, and Canterbury. The well-known figures on the west facade of the
Cathedral of Notre Dame in Paris (near a door called the "Portal of the Last Judgment") are nineteenth-
century versions, perhaps replicating earlier images.
159. SEIFERTH, supra note 154, at 29-32.
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the "light of redemption"'60 could be remedied.''
Synagoga was not the sole embodiment of the harm that blindfolds
imposed. Renaissance images placed a blindfold on Eros to mark the
misguided nature of love, engendering foolishness and confusion.16 2
Renaissance depictions of Fortuna-including illustrations in some versions
of Ripa's Iconologia-often showed her blindfolded to denote irrationality
and randomness.66 Blindfolds also adorned images of executed criminals,
shown hanging and disgraced.'" The general negativity associated with
blindfolds prompted Erwin Panofksy to conclude that, aside from a
valorized blindness in Homer and in the blindfolded Justice (a "humanistic
concoction of very recent origin"), blindness was "always associated with
evil." 65
B. The Polyvocal Blindfold: Foolish and Impartial Judges
Panofsky's suspicion of Justice's blindfold is borne out by turning to
another important European image, The Fool Blindfolding Justice (Figure
19).166 This woodcut, sometimes attributed to Albrecht Dilrer,167 was one of
more than a hundred illustrations for the book The Ship of Fools.'16  Written
by Sebastian Brant in 1494,169 subsequently printed in many languages,17 0
and full of "middle-class moralizing," the volume was popular through the
seventeenth century.' 7'
160. BARASCH,supra note 152, at 79, 83. For example, Giotto showed Synagoga turning her head left
toward darkness and away from the "light that is Christ in the Gospel of John." Laurine Mack Bongiomo,
The Theme of the Old and the New Law in the Arena Chapel, 50 ART BULL. 11, 13-14 (1968).
161. See Nina Rowe, Synogoga Tumbles, a Rider Triumphs: Clerical Viewers and the Filrstenportal
ofBamberg Cathedra, 45 GESTA 15, 26 (2006).
162. See Panofsky, supra note 126, at 95-128; Edgar Wind, Orpheus in Praise of Blind Love, in
PAGAN MYSTERIES IN THE RENAISSANCE 53 (1968).
163. See, e.g., RIPA, MASER EDITION, supra note 120, at 152.
164. Ambrogio Lorenzetti's Allegory of Good Government in Siena, discussed in RESNIK & CURTIS,
supra note 2, at 25-30, provides one such example. RANDOLPH STARN, AMBROGIO LORENZETIT: THE
PALAZZO PUBBLICO, SIENA 70-71 (1994). Shown is a blindfolded man hanging, with his coat blowing in
the wind.
165. Panofsky, supra note 126, at 109.
166. The 1494 image of The Fool Blindfolding Justice, reproduced as Figure 19, was provided by the
Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University.
167. The 1494 image of The Fool Blindfolding Justice, like the other illustrations in the volume, was
not signed, and its attribution is debated.
168. See SEBASTIAN BRANT, THE SHIP OF FOOLS (Edwin H. Zeydel trans., 1944).
169. Brant, bom in Strasbourg, had been a student at the University of Basel and did a doctorate in
law before returning to Strasbourg to serve as "an active and respected legal advisor." Kathleen Wilson-
Chevalier, Sebastian Brant: The Key to Understanding Luca Penni's "Justice and the Seven Deadly Sins,"
78 ART BULL. 238 (1996). An "imperial loyalist," Brant moved from Basel in 1501, after the city left the
Holy Roman Empire and joined the Swiss Confederation. ZIOLKOWSKI,supra note 129, at 100.
170. See JOHN VAN CLEVE, SEBASTIAN BRANT'S THE Stip OF FooLS IN CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE,
1800-1991, at 85 (1993). A first edition in Latin was published in 1497, a Dutch-Flemish edition in 1500,
and one in English in 1509. BRANT, supra note 168, at 24-31.
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Figure 19 (left).
The Fool Blindfolding Justice, Albrecht
Direr, 1494, a woodcut illustrating
Sebastian Brant's Ship of Fools, Basel,
Switzerland.
Reproduced courtesy of the Beinecke Rare Book and
Manuscript Library, Yale University.
Figure 20 (right).
Stultifera navis mortalium,
Sebastian Brant, 1572, Basel,
Switzerland.
Reproduced courtesy of the Beinecke Rare Book and
Manuscript Library, Yale University.
The Fool Blindfolding Justice accompanies a chapter entitled "Quarreling
and Going to Court" with an italicized header, "He'll get much raillery
uncouth / Who fights like children tooth for tooth / And thinks that he can
blind the truth." The woodcut is one of the earliest images known to show a
Justice with covered eyes.172 The deployment was derisive (as Peter
Goodrich's discussion in this Issue explores)"' and the 1572 Basel edition
(Figure 20) made the point all the more vivid by showing the Fool pushing
Justice off her throne as he blindfolded her.174 Indeed, a reader of The Ship
of Fools can have no doubt that Brant, a noted lawyer and law professor,
trained (as he said at the front of his book) in both civil and canon law, saw
blindness as a fault. Brant made the point in his preface (warning against
"folly, blindness, error, and stupidity of all stations and kinds of men"s7 5),
and the chapters that follow repeatedly equate blindness with sin, ignorance,
"incomparable." Id. at 238. As Ziolkowski put it, few modem readers "would suspect that the work was
favorably compared by its contemporaries to Homer's Odyssey." ZIOLKOWSKI,supra note 129, at 98.
172. BRANT, supra note 168, at ch. 71, 236-37 ( "Quarreling and Going to Court"). Several identify
this image as the first to add a blindfold to Justice. See, e.g., WOLFGANG PLEISTER & WOLFGANG SCILD,
RECHT UND GERECHTIGKEIT IM SPIEGEL DER EUROPAISCHEN KUNST 206-07 fig.340 (1988).
173. Peter Goodrich, The Foolosophy ofJustice and the Enigma ofLaw, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
141, 156-57 (2012).
174. Figure 20, from Sebastian Brant, Stultifera Navis Mortallum (1572), is provided courtesy of
the Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University and with the assistance of Mike
Widener.
175. BRANT,supra note 168, at 57.
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and mistakes.17 6
Various hypotheses have been advanced about why the blindfold gained
currency in law and how its meaning shifted over time.' 77 The once-hostile
gesture of affixing a blindfold has been attributed to skepticism about law
and judges in the context of both the Reformation and the Inquisition.
Sebastian Brant's book portrayed the German legal system in disarray,
plagued by local and foreign advocates able to manipulate lay judges who
ought, instead, to be loyal to Roman written law.178 In 1495, the year after
the first edition of The Ship ofFools, Emperor Maximilian formally adopted
Roman law,17 9 and in 1507 the Bamberg Code was instituted in another
effort to guide lay judges. It too had illustrations of blindfolded and dunce-
capped judges,"so leveling critiques parallel to that of Brant-that jurists
needed eyes to follow the superior Roman statutory law rather than
customary law.'
But Ripa's Iconologie offered an alternative reading of covered eyes
176. See, e.g., id. at 168 ("Blind justice is and dead indeed.").
177. For example, Kissel argued that the blindfold was emblematic of a growing separation of
powers, whereas Christian-Nils Robert posited that the blindfold was bivalent, as a "gesture that is
both madness and truth" ("un geste tout A la fois fou et vrai"). See CHRISTIAN-NILS ROBERT, LA
JUSTICE: VERTU COURTISANE ET BOURREAU 88 (1993).
178. BRANT, supra note 168, at ch. 71, 236-37 (illustrated by The Fool Blindfolding Justice),
provides the following verses:
Now of that fool I would report
Who always wants to go to court,
And amicably end no suit
Before he's had a hot dispute
When cases would protracted be,
And men from justice hide or flee....
A foreign speaker must be brought
Imported here from far-off port,
That he may well pervert the case
And cheat the judges to their face.
179. STRAUSS, supra note 55, at 56-57, 65, 261-63.
180. In the illustration, reproduced by Kohler and Scheel at LXI from a 1507 edition, seven
blindfolded jurists, including six lay judges, or "Schoffen" (who are all dressed the same), and one
presiding judge or "Richter" (dressed differently to denote his higher status, as well as sitting in the
place of honor and with a rod of office), are all wearing jesters' caps as well as blindfolds. The image,
known as The Tribunal of Fools, includes a legend on the scroll shown above the heads that reads:
"Out of bad habit these blind fools spend their lives passing judgments contrary to what is right."
Another translation is: "To pass judgments repugnant to what is right and out of sheer bad habit, is the
whole life of these blind fools." Ziolkowski, supra note 130, at 207.
181. See STRAUSS, supra note 55, at 56-95. The 1532 publication of the Carolina "obliged lay
judges who were 'not learned, experienced, or practiced in our imperial laws . . . to seek counsel' in
criminal matters 'at the nearest university, city, or other source of legal knowledge."' Id. at 83
(quoting and translating Article 219 of the Carolina). Whether the local law was itself traditionally
German or already reflected aspects of Roman law is debated, as Europe was a "mosaic" of many
different versions of local practice. See Constantin Fasolt, Hermann Conring and the European
History of Law, in POLITICS AND REFORMATIONS: HISTORIES AND REFORMATIONS (ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF THOMAS A. BRADY, JR.) 113, 116-23 (Christopher Ocker, Michael Printy, Peter Starenko
& Peter Wallace eds., 2007).
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that renders positive the deliberate occlusion of sight-serving to buffer
against, instead of being the source of, missteps. Justice's bandaged eyes
(along with her white robes) showed no "stain of personal interest or of any
other passion that might pervert Justice;" "thus she cannot see anything that
might cause her to judge in a manner that is against reason."' 8 2 Or, as a 1644
Dutch edition reads: "Her eyes are bound to show that the judge, in
evaluating a given case, is not tempted away from using reason."' 8 3
In an Alciatus emblem, The good Prince in his Council (Figure 21),184
its central figure can likewise be found (depending on the edition) with
covered eyes; the explanation (given via a 1542 German version) was
"that he may recognize no-one's status and . . . judge according to his
council."' 85 A French edition of 1536 put it slightly differently: "Their
prince, deprived of his sight, cannot see anybody, and he judges by due
sentence according to what is said in his ear. "186 In a world in which
demands for law were multiplying, the blindfold marked that a judge was
in Senatum boni Principis,
DIALOG ISMVS.
Figure 21. The good Prince in his Council, emblem from the
Complete Works ofAndreas Alciatus, vol. 4, 1582.
Reproduced courtesy of the Rare Book Collection, Lillian Goldman Law Library, Yale Law
School.
182. RIPA, PADUA-1611, supra note 124.
183. DUTCH RIPA-1644, supra note 124, at 432; see also RIPA, MASER EDITION, supra note 120, at
120; 2 RIPA, RICHARDSON EDITION, supra note 124, at 21.
184. The image in Figure 21, from the Alciatus volume, appears courtesy of the Rare Book
Collection of the Lillian Goldman Law Library at Yale Law School.
185. 2 ALCIATUS, DALY EDITION, supra note 123, at emblem 145 and motto (from the 1542
German).
186. Id. at emblem 145 & motto (from the 1536 French).
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supposed to abstain from corrupt, self-interested dealing. Lutheran theology
might also have provided justification, for truth was to come from inner
light.' Moreover, the blindfold also protected the jurist through providing
anonymity, thereby depersonalizing the imposition of violence entailed in
legal sanctions. Rather than what the judge cannot see, the blindfold could
be read to represent what disputants and the public cannot see.
As semioticians know well, the blindfold-now, as then-has no singular
meaning. Elsewhere in Alciatus's work, blindness was shown to be a
punishment. For example, in the emblem called "Just Vengeance," Ulysses
puts his stake into the eye of the Cyclops and blinds him'"-explained in
the 1549 Italian version to demonstrate that the wrong-doer "may suffer bad
things, since he caused them." Ripa likewise proffered a blindfold to
exemplify the indiscriminate force of "Ambizione" (Ambition).' 9 Ripa also
proffered a blindfold for a man called "Errore" (Error), who---cloaked and
with covered eyes-accompanied "Ignoranza" (Ignorance),' 90 a female
sometimes also blind; a lack of knowledge put them in "the shadows" rather
than in the "light" of wisdom.191 Peter Bruegel's Justice, circa 1559, which
Bennett Capers engages in this Issue and about which we wrote in our book,
wears a blindfold (as well as a headdress resembling that used by courtesans
or dunces) as she stands in the midst of scenes of torture and mayhem.' 92
The double valence of the blindfold persists today. While many
contemporary Justices, such as those shown at the outset, valorize the
187. See OTro RUDOLF KISSEL, DIE JUSTITIA: REFLEXIONEM OBER EIN SYMBOL UND SEINE
DARSTELLUNG IN DER BILDENDEN KUNST 90, nn. 155, 156 (1984); see also ZAPALAC, supra note 48,
at 26-55. Martin Jay argued that the Reformation embraced the "Hebrew interdiction of images" as a
way to "resist what Augustine had famously called the 'lust of the eyes,"' and thus made the blindfold
no longer a sign of inferiority but a marker of "neutrality." See Martin Jay, Must Justice Be Blind?, in
LAW AND THE IMAGE 19-21 (Costas Douzinas & Lynda Nead eds., 1999); see also ROBERT JACOB,
IMAGES DE LA JUSTICE: ESSAI SUR L'ICONOGRAPHIE JUDICIARE DU MOYEN AGE A L'AGE CLASSIQUE
234-36 (1994). Yet, in addition to arguing that the "love of truth" to bring "light," id. at 90, Luther
also wrote: "Therefore he must be quite blind, have his eyes and ears closed, neither see nor hear, but
go straight forward in everything that comes before him, and decide accordingly." Martin Luther, The
Large Catechism, in TRIGLOT CONCORDIA: THE SYMBOLICAL BOOKS OF THE Ev. LUTHERAN
CHURCH 565 (F. Bente & W.H.T. Dau trans., 1921). Further, "[W]hat kind of judge would he be who
should blindly judge matters which he neither heard nor saw?" Martin Luther, Secular Authority: To
What Extent It Should Be Obeyed, in MARTIN LUTHER: SELECTIONS FROM His WRITINGS 384 (John
Dillenberger ed., 1962). Moreover, as we detail, various derisive or ambiguous examples of the
blindfold can be found throughout Northern Europe. See RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 2, at 69-75.
188. Id. at emblem 172 ("Just Vengeance").
189. RIPA, MASER EDITION, supra note 120, at fig.31; RIPA, PADUA-1611, supra note 124, at 14; 1
RIPA, PADUA-1618, supra note 124, at 37-39 (invoking Seneca).
190. FRENCH RIPA-1644, supra note 124, at 61; RIPA, PADUA-161 1, supra note 124, at 146-47; 1
RIPA, PADUA-1 618, supra note 124, at 145.
191. RIPA, PADUA-1611, supra note 124, at 240-41; 1 RIPA, PADUA- 1618, supra note 124, at 206-
07. In the RIPA, MASER EDITION, supra note 120, at 125, this transforms into "Incredulity," and the entry
cites Ripa's 1603 version at 68 ("CecitA della Mente") and at 222 ("Ignoranza"). Another figure of
Ignorance is a man with "bandaged eye" to denote a figurative "blindness to all matters of the intellect."
192. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 2, at 70-72 & fig.53; I. Bennett Capers, Blind Justice, 24
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 179, 188-89 (2012).
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blindfold, cartoonists regularly rely on a blindfolded Justice to denote
injustice. In 1988, for example, the Los Angeles Times ran the Paul
Conrad cartoon in which a Justice holds a coat hanger instead of scales to
suggest the cruder methods used to induce abortions prior to the Supreme
Court's recognition that abortion rights (invoked through the case named
Roe v. Wade) were constitutionally protected."' Justice, if banning
abortions, is rendered blind to the harm of the coat hanger abortions that
would ensue.
C. Sight, Wisdom, Knowledge, and Judgment
Given the competing implications of blindfolds in the sixteenth century,
how did a positive valence gain dominance and why does that attribute
continue to attract attention? Beginning in the seventeenth century, law's
applications proliferated in growing urban centers. At the same time,
political theory, science, and technology became preoccupied with
explorations about how information was gathered and processed. As
theorists from various disciplines became quizzical about the nature of
knowledge, authority, God, and truth, the valence of open eyes to denote
unimpeded receipt of knowledge shifted. Epistemological doubt-about
the import of facts, the uncertainty of recollection, the imperfect
interpretation of law, the flaws of decisionmakers-contributed to anxiety
about judicial failures. Sight was no longer unproblematic, as reflected in
a range of commentary, from Descartes's admonition of the need to
escape the confusion of the sensesl94 to Goethe's comment that Justice
was blindfolded "to avoid being dazzled by imposters."'
The prior equation of knowledge with sight weakened as science began
to show that eyes could play tricks, and that new optical instruments could
alter sight. The camera obscura gained currency in the sixteenth
century,' 96 followed around 1600 by the invention of the telescope and the
microscope 97 and by interest in the idea of probability."' Philosophers
puzzled over the Aristotelian hierarchy of the senses, in part through what
is known as the "Molyneux Problem."l 99 In 1694, John Locke asked what
193. Alternative to Roe vs. Wade, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1988, at 115.
194. See RENA DESCARTES, MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY WITH SELECTIONS FROM THE
OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES 24 (John Cottingham trans., 1986) ("1 will now shut my eyes, stop my ears,
and withdraw all my senses.").
195. JOHANNN WOLFGANG VAN GOETHE, TASSO 46 (Robert David McDonald trans., 1994).
196. See JONATHAN CRARY, TECHNIQUES OF THE OBSERVER: ON VISION AND MODERNITY IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY 26-53 (1990).
197. See MARJOLEIN DEGENAAR, MOLYNEUX'S PROBLEM: THREE CENTURIES OF DISCUSSION ON
THE PERCEPTION OF FORMS 18 (Michael J. Collins trans., 1996).
198. See IAN HACKING, THE EMERGENCE OF PROBABILITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF EARLY
IDEAS ABOUT PROBABILITY, INDUCTION AND STATISTICAL INFERENCE 9-12 (1975).
199. The name comes from William Molyneux, who put the problem to John Locke in 1688. See
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a "Man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish
between a Cube, and a Sphere of the same metal" would see and know if
able to regain sight: could he distinguish between a cube and a sphere on
first sight?200 Molyneux's problem was not only a heuristic device.
Physicians of the eighteenth century were intervening to cure a form of
blindness caused by cataracts. 20 1 Blindness, once a state of irredeemable
"othemess," 202 became a "subject of intense cultural interest"203 in
science, philosophy, and the arts.20
By the eighteenth century, the blindfold on Justice had shed its
connections to Synogoga's failures to see the light of Christianity, to
jesters made buffoons because they could not see, and to the condemned,
blindfolded before execution. Instead, when placed on Justice, the
blindfold was turned into a symbol of law's commitment to rationality
and even-handedness. The depiction of a Justice whose vision was
obscured came to represent some sought-after quality-a needed
neutrality, inner wisdom, a lack of distraction, or incorruptibility. Justice,
blindfolded, could also denote the triumph of positivism and of a
commitment to rationality.2 0 5
By the nineteenth century, the blindfold gained a reputation for marking
a new idea about the position of the judge-independence. Didactic
imagery from the thirteenth through the sixteenth century aimed to make
judges acutely aware of their subservience to God (by way of Last
Judgment scenes) and to rulers (The Judgment of Cambyses is
illustrative). Judges and rulers were once seen appropriately intertwined,
MICHAEL J. MORGAN, MOLYNEUX'S QUESTION: VISION, TOUCH AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION
(1977); PAULSON, supra note 150, at 21-23. Molyneux, a member of the Irish Parliament who lived from
1656 to 1698, had a wife who was blind. MORGAN, supra, at 6.
200. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 146 (Peter H. Nidditch ed.,
1975); MORGAN, supra note 199; PAULSON, supra note 150, 21-23. Arguing that understanding came
from mixing sensory perceptions and analytic interpretation, Locke posited that a person could not, at
first sight, make the judgment required to distinguish and name the two objects. LOCKE, supra, at 146-
47. Locke and Molyneux assumed that sight would follow analysis, and focused on what ideas came with
the presumed "full range of visual experience." MORGAN, supra note 199, at 7.
Yet that view of "knowledge of space and depth [as] built up out of an orderly accumulation and cross-
referencing of perceptions on a plane independent of the viewer" was an eighteenth-century attitude
assuming the senses to be an "adjunct of a rational mind;" in the nineteenth century, the world became
seen as organized by "exchange and flux," where knowledge was "bound up in touch." CRARY, supra note
196, at 59-62.
201. In 1728, the surgeon William Cheselden published an article describing an account of his
operation on a young man who had cataracts. DEGENAAR, supra note 197, at 52.
202. PAULSON, supra note 150, at 8-10, 26-32.
203. Id. at 3.
204. In 1749, Diderot published his Lettre sur les aveugles a I'usage de ceux qui voient (An
Essay on Blindness in a Letter to a Person of Distinction), which engages the Molyneux problem.
MORGAN, supra note 199, at 27-28. Morgan also translates Diderot's "Letter." Id. at 31-58.
205. The earlier deployment of religious imagery (Last Judgments and the Crucifixion) may have
served as a buffer from local authority. See Robert Jacob, Le jugement de Dieu et la formation de la
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as Alciatus's sixteenth-century emblem (Figure 21) illustrates. The
sightless presiding jurist (called the Prince, King, or Judge, depending on
the translation) was to render judgment according to the advice of his
council, a group of men all shown sighted.
The development of the idea that judges were deployed by, but sat
somehow independent of, state power constituted a shift in political
theory, often credited to Montesquieu's 1748 proposition that "there is no
liberty, if the judicial power be not separated from the legislative and
executive." 206 The related notion is that judges have the power to sit in
judgment of the state, their own employer. A few famous "folktales of
jurisdiction," as Robert Cover called them, can be found in biblical and
common law narratives in which brave judges stood their ground against
threats of tyrannical kings; those judges insisted on their own authority to
speak "truth to power." 20 7
Not until after the Enlightenment did such extraordinary confrontations
come to represent a required facet of the judicial role, positioned at a
critical distance from the state. Indeed, the term "state" was not normally
used until around 1600, when it then referred to the powers within the
exclusive purview of a small set of ruling elites. 2 08 Over the centuries and
across polities, commitments to some degree of individual liberty and
popular opinion undermined premises that kings were the only
incarnations of sovereignty interests. 209 Conceptions of civil liberty came
to entail limitations on the state, including governments ruled by
monarchs.
In this "march to modernity" (to borrow Theodore Rabb's book title),
sovereignty shifted; the eighteenth-century preamble of the American
Constitution opened with the phrase "We the People of the United
States." That document also specified an independent sphere for judges.
Building on the English Act of Settlement of 1701, the United States
Constitution of 1789 required in its text that judges, once appointed, were
to keep their jobs "during good Behaviour" and were to receive salaries
that could not be diminished while they served.2"o In the wake of these
new understandings, the blindfold was read to mark not only judges'
neutrality as between parties but also that judges were untethered from the
government that employed them.
Yet, while the attributes of scales and sword are generally taken for
206. 1 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 181 (1748).
207. Robert Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP. U. L. REv. 179, 190
(1985).
208. See THEODORE K. RABB, THE LAST DAYS OF THE RENAISSANCE AND THE MARCH TO
MODERNITY 48-49 (2006).
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granted, the blindfold continues to provoke commentary about what it
denotes about the relationships among sight, knowledge, wisdom,
judgment, and justice, and about law's particular role in those
productions. From art to political theory, new perspectives on the mind
and the eye undermined the plausibility and the desirability of judging
from a singular vantage point. The cubism of twentieth-century art broke
the linear planes of earlier conventions to offer, simultaneously, views from
multiple angles. Deconstructionism objected to the hegemony of a single
meta-narrative confidently promulgated by one authoritative voice. These
intellectual shifts constituted, as Jonathan Crary explained, a "rupture with
Renaissance, or classical models of vision,"2 1' which had posited an
objectivity that the multiplication of images and texts rendered palpably
subjective. A "spectator" sits passive, while an "observer" produces as well
as receives information. Observers are not, however, autonomous, nor are
their eyes "innocent;"2 12 "embedded in a system of conventions and
limitations," they (and we) are situated to see "within a prescribed set of
possibilities."2 13
Yet embeddedness poses yet other problems, making the distancing that
blindfolds suggest appealing to some. John Rawls provides the leading
example in his 1971 volume, A Theory of Justice. Rawls relied upon the
heuristic of reasoning "behind a veil of ignorance" to put one into an
"original position" that precluded knowledge about one's own class,
social status, abilities, intelligence, life plan, or generational situation and
of the surrounding social, economic, or political order.214 Veiled, one
could develop principles without knowing whether one was "advantaged
or disadvantaged . . . by the outcome of natural chance or the contingency
of social circumstances."2 15
But reasoning behind veils and blindfolds has critics, as the
contemporary debate in the United States about the desirability of a
"color-blind constitution" makes plain. When Justice Harlan put forth the
term "color-blind" in 1896, he wrote in dissent, protesting the Supreme
Court's approval of segregated railway cars. Harlan spoke of the "eye of
the law" when he insisted that the United States was a place without caste;
the country had no "superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens" because
211. CRARY, supra note 196, at 3. The "collapse of the camera obscura as a model for the
condition of the observer" meant that there was no longer a fixed place, but instead multiple points of
view, no longer one fixed source of light, but vision as present in the perception. Id. at 137.
212. Id. at 95 (citing 15 JOHN RUSKIN, THE WORKS OF JOHN RUSKIN 27 (1906) and describing
the "innocence of the eye" as "a sort of childish perception of these flat stains of color ... as a blind
man would see them if suddenly gifted with sight").
213. Id. at 5-6.
214. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-37 (1971).
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the Constitution was "color-blind." 2 16
At that time, "colored" referred to dark skin-hence the name chosen in
1909 by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP).2 17 That point was made again in the 1920s when twelve
lawyers met in Des Moines, Iowa and formed the National Bar
Association, an organization of "practicing attorneys of the Negro race" 218
that sought to eradicate the second-class citizenship of "the American of
Color." 2 19 In 1896, when Justice Harlan aspired that the law's "eye" be
"blind," he knew that, were the law to "see," it would (and did)
discriminate against dark-skinned peoples.
Only much later, and in part as critical race theorists explored social
constructions of the meaning of race, did the idea develop that everyone
has a "color"-whether white, black, or part of the "rainbow" in
between. 2 20 Toward the end of the twentieth century, white students and
white employees lodged what are called "reverse discrimination" claims;
they argued that they, too, had been subjected to unfair treatment based on
the color of their skin. In 2007, on behalf of a majority of five, Chief
Justice Roberts adapted Justice Harlan's metaphor when holding invalid
an affirmative action plan that had taken into account the races and
ethnicities of schoolchildren so that the lower schools in Seattle,
Washington, and St. Louis, Missouri, might be somewhat diverse. 22 ' That
interpretation chose "blindness" to all skin colors, rather than taking into
account the different histories of blacks and whites that the historic laws
of slavery and segregation had produced.
An eloquent rejection of that position comes from a 1920s poem,
Justice, by Langston Hughes:
That Justice is a blind goddess
Is a thing to which we black are wise.
Her bandage hides two festering sores
That once perhaps were eyes.m
216. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
217. August Meier & John H. Bracey Jr., The NAACP as a Reform Movement, 1909-1965: "To
Reach the Conscience ofAmerica," 59 J. S. HIST. 3,9-10 (1993).
218. ELMER C. JACKSON JR. & JACOB U. GORDON, A SEARCH FOR EQUAL JUSTICE BY AFRICAN-
AMERiCAN LAWYERS: A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION 14-16 (1999).
219. Id. at xi (quoting an inaugural address by its president, Thurman L. Dodson).
220. See generally Margalynne J. Armstrong & Stephanie M. Wildman, Teaching Race/Teaching
Whiteness: Transforming Colorblindness to Color Insight, 86 N.C. L. REV. 635 (2008).
221. Parents Involved in Community Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). Chief
Justice Roberts's opinion quoted from the Plessy opinion. Id. at 731. Justice Clarence Thomas's
concurrence used the phrase "color-blind" several times. Id. at 772, 780, 782. The impassioned dissent by
Justice Breyer argued that prior cases had not followed the version of color-blindness proposed by Justice
Thomas but rather had attended to the "asymmetry between that which seeks to exclude and that which
seeks to include members of minority races." Id. at 830.
222. Langston Hughes, Justice, in TH1E COLLECTED POEMS OF LANGSTON HUGHES (Arnold
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First published in the Amsterdam News in 1923, Hughes's Justice was
part of his 1932 collection, Scottsboro Limited.223 The title refers to the
convictions of nine black young men ("the Scottsboro Boys"), taken from
a freight train, charged in Alabama courts, found guilty of raping two
young white women, and sentenced to death in 1931 224 Hughes sparked
and joined a chorus of protests, both national and international, about their
treatment. In 1937, Alabama released four of the nine. 2 25 Almost a half-
century later, in 1976, Alabama's Governor George Wallace pardoned the
last living defendant, then still in prison.226
In the 1970s, when some 130 black judges met in Atlanta, Georgia to
form their own organization within the National Bar Association (founded
for the advancement of black lawyers), they embraced Hughes's approach.
That Judicial Council, dedicated to the "eradication of racial and class
bias from every aspect of the judicial and law enforcement processes, "227
picked as its motto: "Let us remove the blindfold from the eyes of
American justice." For an emblem, they selected a depiction of Justice
taking her blindfold off her eyes (Figure 22).228 As the Honorable George
W. Crockett, addressing that first convention, explained:
Justice is supposed to be blind. It treats all individuals alike-rich or
poor, black or white, male or female. Well, it's time to remove the
blindfold that gives the illusion of fair treatment. We want to expose
to the full glare of reality the inequities superimposed on that great
but unrealized objective. We want to see its errors, to identify its
prejudices and to expose those who would pervert just laws with
unjust penalties.229
Rampersad ed., 1994). The poem, Copyright 1994 by the Estate of Langston Hughes, is used in
Representing Justice with the permission of Alfred A. Knopf, a division of Random House Inc., and
Harold Ober Associates (as required by Random House under grant 271977 (Feb. 2010)).
223. See JOSEPH MCLAREN, LANGSTON HUGHES: FOLK DRAMATIST IN THE PROTEST TRADITION,
1921-1943, at 33-40 (1997); HANS OSTROM, A LANGSTON HUGHES ENCYCLOPEDIA 195 (2002). Hughes
republished Justice in 1938 in A New Song. There, the phrase "we black" in the second line of the poem
became "we poor." See LANGSTON HUGHES, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF LANGSTON HUGHES, VOL. 1:
THE POEMS, 1921-1940, at 133 (Arnold Rampersad ed., 2001).
224. See DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SouTH 3-48, 166 (1979);
Hugh T. Murray, Jr., Changing America and the Changing Image ofScottsboro, 38 PHYLON 82 (1977).
225. In 1948, one of those still incarcerated escaped from prison. Captured in 1950 in Michigan,
that state's governor refused to return him to the South. Murray, supra note 224, at 85-86.
226. MCLAREN, supra note 223, at 34.
227. Gilbert Ware, Proceedings: Founding Convention of the Judicial Council of the National Bar
Association, 20 J. PUB. L. 371, 371 (1971). By the late 1990s, more than 18,000 black lawyers, judges,
legal scholars, and students were members of the National Bar Association.
228. The facsimile by Yale Press in Figure 22 is of the logo of the Judicial Council and is reproduced
with the permission of the Honorable Michael Bagneris, 2006 Chair of the Judicial Council of the National
Bar Association, and with the assistance of Maurice Foster of that organization. Our thanks to the
Honorable Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, State of Louisiana, for
bringing this image to our attention and for his tireless efforts in making it available to us.
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From Ripa through this emblem, from Locke through Harlan,
Frankfurter, and Roberts, the puzzles of sight's relationship to judgment
remain. More than two centuries after the Molyneux Problem was first
posed, theorists continue to probe the relationship of sight to conceptual
thinking and to judgment.230 Psychologists and behaviorists ponder
concepts such as framing, heuristics, schema, and implicit biases 23 1 that
shape what we purport to "know" and to "see." 23 2 Lawyers argue what
evidence should be admitted into court, constitutional theorists debate
what histories and practices are relevant to interpretation, and artists
depict Justice sometimes as clear-eyed, sometimes with eyes shaded,
sometimes with diaphanous blindfolds, and sometimes with eyes
occluded.233
'Let us remove the blindfold from
the eyes of American justice.
Too long has it obscured the unequal
treatment accorded poor people
and black people under our law,"
Figure 22.
Logo, Judicial Council of the
National Bar Association, 1971.
Reproduced courtesy of the Judicial Council of the
National Bar Association.
230. See, e.g., Richard Held et al., The Newly Sighted Fail To Match Seen with Felt, 14 NATURE 551-
53 (2011); Nicholas Bakalar, Study of Vision Tackles a Philosophy Riddle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2011, at
D6. Contemporary studies make plain that "perception is not necessarily to be equated with the input from
particular sense organs." MORGAN, supra note 199, at 207.
231. See, e.g., HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (Thomas
Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002); Kristin A. Lane, Jason P. Mitchell & Mahzarin R.
Banaji, Me and My Group: Cultural Status Can Disrupt Cognitive Consistency, 23 Soc. COGNITION 353
(2005).
232. Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going To
Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARv. L. REV. 837 (2009).
233. Examples, including a Justice with eyes shaded, by Joshua Reynolds, and a contemporary
statue of a Justice tying or untying her own blindfold, by Diana Moore, are in RESNIK & CURTIS,
supra note 2, at 99-101 & fig.71-75.
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VI. IDENTITY, RIGHTS, AND REPRESENTATION
The logo of the Judicial Council provides a pivot for our discussion, as
it is one of many examples of new Justice imagery shaped to take into
account the meaning of democracy for courts. Kristin Collins maps how,
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Justice became an
icon for feminists, insisting on legal rights to equality.234 William Simon
puzzles about what visual translations of the work of contemporary courts
ought to be promoted, as he offers examples from manufacturing of
collaborative product production. 235 And John Leubsdorf calls on us to
consider representations and practices of justice outside of courtrooms.
Here we focus on what versions of Justice were seen, in the twentieth
century, as appropriately iconic for courtroom use. As long as rulers ran
the world, gaining authority from God, monarchy or oligarchy, they
deployed images of their choice-be they Last Judgments, esteemed male
jurists, classical narratives, or abstract Virtues shown as women. But as
popular government shifted the procedure for selection of public
commissions to committees of citizens, and as women and men of all
colors gained juridical capacity as litigants, witnesses, staff and, eventually,
as jurors, lawyers, and judges, decisions about what images ought to adorn
courthouses became problematic.
A woman presented as Justice had to look like someone. No longer only a
disembodied goddess serving as a vessel to legitimate authority, portrayals
of Justice occasioned real debates about what kind of woman could serve as
the embodiment of iconic Virtue and which were excluded. In the United
States and elsewhere, conflicts have erupted about what has been displayed,
with some depictions controversial at their inception and others becoming
sources of distress decades later, when new rights holders looked at the walls
and saw demeaning portrayals of persons they resembled.
Examples of the political pressures on Justice's visage come by way of
four images discussed, briefly, below.2 36 Two commissions were made by
the United States Department of the Treasury, which, in the 1930s, was in
charge of federal buildings and used funds from the Works Project
Administration (WPA) to support art as well as architecture. 237 We turn next
to two contemporary installations, produced through the United States
General Services Administration (GSA), the entity now tasked with federal
234. Kristin A. Collins, Representing Injustice: Justice as an Icon of Woman Suffrage, 24 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 191 (2012).
235. William H. Simon, Courthouse Iconography and Chayesian Judicial Practice, 24 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 419 (2012).
236. For fuller discussions and sources, see RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 2, at 106-28.
237. See JONATHAN HARRIS, FEDERAL ART AND NATIONAL CULTURE: THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY IN
NEW DEAL AMERICA (1995); MARLENE PARK & GERALD E. MARKOWITZ, DEMOCRATIC VISTAS: POST
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government buildings. Its Art-in-Architecture program authorizes set-asides
of about one-half of one percent of the estimated construction costs of new
federal buildings for public art, 238 awarded through a competitive process.239
A. A "Mulatto" Justice in South Carolina and an "Indian" Lynched in
Idaho
In the 1930s, the federal government built a new courthouse and post
office in Aiken, South Carolina, a town that had garnered national attention
in the 1920s when a mob killed black teenagers after their convictions had
been overturned by the South Carolina Supreme Court.24 0 The government
commission went to Stefan Hirsch, a successful artist based in the
Northeast.2 4 1
Hirsch's mural, Justice as Protector and Avenger (Figure 23 and Color
Plate 1), more than twelve by twelve feet, was installed in 1938 behind the
242judge's bench in a courtroom. At the center is Justice, presented as an
imposing figure, open-eyed, wearing a blue skirt and bright red shirt, hair
drawn back in a bun, barefoot, and tanned. Some critics called the style
cubist, while others saw social realism and the influence of the Mexican
muralists with whom Hirsch had studied.243 Hirsch explained that he created
"a symbolic figure of 'Justice' with gestures indicating the meting out of
justice to the deserving and the undeserving," 244 and that his "gigantic
238. See generally RESNIK& CURTIS, supra note 2, at 181-84; DONALD THALACKER, THE PLACE OF
ART IN THE WORLD OF ARCHITECTURE (1980); John Wetenhall, Camelot's Legacy to Public Art:
Aesthetic Ideology in the New Frontier, 48 ART J. 303, 304 (1989).
239. See U.S General Services Administration, Art-in-Architecture Program, 41 CFR Pt. 120, §
102.5, available at http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/I04456; see also Salik K. Ghandhi, The Pendulum
ofArt Procurement Policy: The Art-in-Architecture Program's Struggle to Balance Artistic Freedom and
Public Acceptance, 31 PUB. CONT. L.J. 535, 552 (2002).
240. Meier & Bracey, supra note 217, at 9-10.
241. Hirsch, who was born in 1899 and died in 1964, taught at Bennington and Bard Colleges. Our
discussion draws on GSA Archives, Public Building Services, Fine Arts Collection, 477, Stefan Hirsch
[hereinafter GSA Archives/FA 477, Hirsch description], and on Stefan Hirsch & Elsa Rogo Papers,
1926-1985 (Boxes 1-3, 11) in the Archives of American Art, Smithsonian Institution, http://siris-
archives.si.edulipac20/ipac.jsp?&profile=all&source-!siarchives&uri=full=3 100001-!216012-!0#f
ocus (which we have corrected for obvious typographical and spelling errors), as well as from SUE
BRIDWELL BECKHAM, DEPRESSION POST OFFICE MURALS AND SOUTHERN CULTURE: A GENTLE
RECONSTRUCTION 15, 44-45 (1989); HAYES, supra note 15; KARAL ANN MARLING, WALL TO WALL
AMERICA: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF POST OFFICE MURALS IN THE GREAT DEPRESSION 29,50 (1982); and
PARK & MARKOWITZ, supra note 237, at 61.
242. Our thanks to Susan Harrison, formerly of the Art-in-Architecture Program and to Kathryn
Erickson and Erin Clay of the Collection of Fine Arts of the GSA for their generous help in obtaining
historical materials and the photograph reproduced in Figure 23, courtesy of the Fine Arts Collection,
United States General Services Administration. The Aiken building was subsequently named the Charles
E. Simons Jr. Federal Courthouse after Judge Simons, who had served as the Chief Judge for the District of
South Carolina from 1980 to 1986.
243. BECKHAM, supra note 241, at 45; A Huge Cover-Up, THE POST & COURIER, Apr. 12, 1996, at
B4.
244. Aiken: The Trial of "Justice, " an information booklet related to the symposium New Deal Art
Patronage in South Carolina, Sept. 20-21, 1990, South Carolina Humanities Council, in GSA Archives, FA
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female figure" was "without any of the customary or traditional
appurtenances of such symbolic representations (scale, sword, book . . .)"245
Further, she was a "healthy, young person ... clad in a simple garment ...
neither modish nor classical .. .. [T]he only allegory I permitted myself was
to use the red, white and blue [of the United States flag] for her
garments." 246
Figure 23. Justice as Protector and Avenger, Stefan Hirsch, 1938, Charles E.
Simons, Jr. Federal Courthouse, Aiken, South Carolina. See also Color Plate 1.
Reproduced courtesy of the Fine Arts Collection, United States General Services Administration.
477.
245. The correspondence between Hirsch and Forbes Watson, Advisor to the Section of Painting &
Sculpture of the Treasury Department (and this letter of May 18, 1938) comes from the archival
materials cited supra note 241.
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That was not how others saw it. A local newspaper objected to the
"barefooted mulatto woman wearing bright-hued clothing," while the sitting
federal judge termed it a "monstrosity" 2 4 7- a "profanation of the otherwise
perfection" of the courthouse.2 48 Within the month, the judge had "ordered
that the mural be hidden with a cloth until it could be removed." 24 9
As the GSA subsequently described, federal officials attributed the
criticisms to "ignorance" but offered a "compromise"-that the artist would
"lighten Justice's skin color and cover the mural while court was in
session." 25 0 The mural was not, however, repainted. Although the judge,
aided by South Carolina's Governor, sought removal, the denouement was a
tan velvet curtain covering the imagery.25 1
This 1930s conflict about depiction is one of several making plain that
certain figures could not pass, uncontested, into the deserving ranks of those
who qualified to represent Justice.252 Nor, in that era, could people labeled
"mulattos" gain much protection from the courts as a matter of law. But fifty
years later, long after the Supreme Court had decided Brown v. Board of
Education, members of the Aiken community raised money to make the
mural visible by relocating it to the Aiken County Judicial Center. Senator
Strom Thurmond (who represented South Carolina in Congress from 1954
to 2003 and was once famous for his racist views) wrote to the GSA to
support the move.253 Conservators, however, deemed the mural too fragile to
relocate, and it remains behind curtains. According to a local newspaper
reporter writing in 2001, the mural was not displayed during court sessions
because the "flamboyant green background and the vibrant clothes on Lady
Justice" made the "power of the gavel pale." Instead, the curtains are parted
and the mural shown only "by request. "254
247. PARK & MARKOWITZ, supra note 237, at 61. MARLING, supra note 241, at 64-65, quoted a
newspaper as reporting that spectators objected that Justice "resembled a 'mulatto.'
248. Matthew Boedy, Controversy Shadows Mural, AUGUSTA CHRONICLE, Aug. 26,2001, at C2; see
also A Judicious Answer, 10 ART DIG. 10 (1938).
249. GSA Archives, Public Building Services, Fine Arts Collection, FA 477 Stefan Hirsch
[hereinafter GSA Archives].
250. Id.
251. MARLING, supra note 241, at 71.
252. Other examples-such as a Justice perceived to look like the "ruthless spirit of confiscation"
and relegated to a corner in a courthouse in Newark, New Jersey-are provided in RESNIK & CURTIS,
supra note 2, at 108-10.
253. GSA Archives, supra note 249.
254. Boedy, supra note 248, at C2.
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rigure 4. iviuras, arnourea to ivan arnlet, circa 17 m vinu-a
Courthouse, Ada, Idaho. Photographer: Paul Hosefros, 2007. See also
Color Plate 2.
Copyright: Paul Hosefros for Lemley International. Reproduced with the permission of the photographer.
Yet, at the same time that the "mulatto" Justice was covered as unsightly,
another WPA mural, "depicting an Indian being lynched" (Figure 24 and
Color Plate 2) was placed on the walls of the Ada County Courthouse in
Boise, Idaho.2 55 This image, showing an "Indian in buckskin breeches, on
his knees with his hands bound behind his back . . . flanked by a man
holding a rifle and another armed man holding the end of a noose dangling
255. Our thanks to Paul Hosefros and to Lemley International for providing us with the photograph
for Figure 24 and permission to reproduce it. The design of the Ada Courthouse mural likely came from
Ivan Bartlett, building on sketches from Fletcher Martin, and the murals were executed by various





Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
from a tree," 256 was one of two dozen murals installed.
While some objections were raised at the time, largely on aesthetic
grounds, it was not until late in the twentieth century when a judge in Idaho
concluded that the imagery "would be offensive, and rightfully offensive, to
some people" and ordered the mural draped with flags of the state and of the
United States.257 In 2006, when the Idaho State Legislature was using the
building as its temporary residence, the question debated was whether the
mural ought to be painted over, preserved as it was, or displayed with new
educational explanations of past prejudices. In 2007, the state legislative
committee, reportedly guided by the views of local Indian tribes, decided
that the murals were to remain on view, framed by "official interpretive
signs."258 One state official explained: "They reflect our values at the
time.
Thus, unlike Aiken, where the government literally rendered the depiction
invisible, officials in Idaho raised the possibility of conversation. Although
the minutes of the Idaho legislature do not cite Michel Foucault, the
Figure 25.






Steffen Larsen. See also
Color Plate 3.
Reproduced with the pernission of
the artist and the photographer and
courtesy of the United States General
Services Administration.
256. See John Miller, Idaho Murals of Lynching Cause Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2006
[hereinafter Miller, Idaho Murals]; see also John Miller, Murals ofLynching Divide Officials, DENVER
POST, Apr. 13, 2006 [hereinafter Miller, Murals of Lynching]. Idaho papers reported criticism of the
quality of the design and execution. See Idaho Artist Believes Apathy Toward New Murals Justified,
IDAHO STATESMAN, July 4,1940, at 10.
257. See John Miller, Criticized Murals Hang in Courthouse, CASPER STAR-TRIBUNE, May 15, 2005
(quoting then Chief Justice Gerald Schroeder, who had ordered the draping when a district judge).
258. Miller, Idaho Murals, supra note 256.
259. John Miller, Indian Leaders View Murals of Lynching, CASPER-STAR TRIBUNE, Jan. 19, 2007.
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outcome-displaying murals of lynching-opens up a way to glimpse gaps
between law's claims to authority and its practices through seeing what the
state once thought appropriate for courthouse display.26 0
B. Skin Color and Abstraction
During the second half of the twentieth century, the GSA took over the
building projects of the United States and, as noted, developed the Art-in-
Architecture program. GSA archives of decisions permit us to learn that, as
of 2009, federal commissions had produced one artistic rendering of a
nonwhite Justice, Lady of Justice (Figure 25 and Color Plate 3 ).261 The
statue, by Jan Mitchell, an artist resident of St. Croix, was installed in 1993
at the door of the federal courthouse in the Virgin Islands, 26 2 a territorial
possession of the United States, bought in 1917.263 Of the 110,000 people
who live in the U.S. Virgin Islands, about three quarters are black, and many
Figure 26. Moco Jumbie, Jan R. Figure 27. Mystical Mocko Jumbies,
Mitchell, 1993. Photographer: United States Virgin Islands Carnival,
Steffan Larsen. 1997. Photographer: Robert W.
Reproduced with the peruission of the artist and the Nicholls, University of the Virgin
photographer. Islands.
Reproduced with the permission of the photographer.
260. FOUCAULT, supra note 3, at 8.
261. Our thanks to artist Jan Mitchell, to photographer Steffen Larsen, and to the Mitchell-Larsen
Studio for information obtained through an interview on Feb. 24, 2007, for providing us with the
photographs of Moco Jumbie (Figure 26), Reaching Man (Figure 28), and Lady ofJustice (Figure 25), and
for permission to use them; to Susan Harrison for suggesting this avenue of research; to the U.S. General
Services Administration for reproduction permissions; and to the Honorable Anne E. Thompson of the
U.S. District Court of New Jersey for additional pictures of the courthouse, its imagery, and the artist.
262. The courthouse is named after Almeric L. Christian, who served as Chief Judge of that court.
263. Robert W. Nicholls, The Mocko Jumbie of the U.S. Virgin Islands: History and Antecedents, 32
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are descendants of slaves brought from Africa
and emancipated in 1848.26
While Mitchell's Lady of Justice is
innovative in bringing a dark-skinned Justice
into view in a federal courthouse, Mitchell's
completed work is wholly different from what
she had originally proposed.265 The figure was
selected in lieu of two gritty alternatives
proffered by the artist to evoke the Virgin
Islands' ties to African history and the struggles
for freedom by enslaved Africans.
Mitchell had first suggested a nine-foot-tall
bronze statue (Figure 26) based on an island
legend of "Moco Jumbie," an African folklore
figure that had a special connection to the
Virgin Islands.266 Moco Jumbies are "thought to
bring good luck and bestow beneficence," 267
descending from trees to assist distressed
islanders. Figure 27, an evocative photograph
by Robert Nicholls, was taken in 1997 during
the Virgin Islands Carnival,26 8 where such
figures had been portrayed since the eighteenth
century. Like the Renaissance Prudence (seen in
Figure 13) shown with a mirror and sometimes
a second face looking backward, Moco Jumbies
can "metaphorically . . . see what is happening
both in the present and in the future." 26 9
But, according to GSA records, the "District
Court family" thought that putting a statue of a
Moco Jumbie outside of its court would be
"unsuitable as a symbol of justice." While
"definitely Caribbean," the "jester of sort" had a
name associated with mockery and the
courthouse was a place for the community to
"look for fair play and justice, tempered with
Figure 28. Reaching Man, Jan
R. Mitchell, 1991.
Photographer: Steffen Larsen.
Reproduced with the permission of the artist
and the photographer.
264. Id. at 48.
265. This discussion is drawn fiom GSA Archives, Public Building Services, Fine Arts Collection,
AA 208 Mitchell, and materials provided to us by Jan Mitchell [hereinafter GSA Archives, AA 208].
266. The term is variously spelled, as Mocko Jumbie or Moko Jumbie.
267. Nicholls, supra note 263, at 54.
268. The 1997 photograph in Figure 27, taken by Robert Nicholls at the Virgin Islands Carnival, is
used with his permission and is also found in his article on the subject.
269. Nicholls, supra note 263, at 54.
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mercy-hardly a place for clowning or jesting."2 7 0 The proposal was
rejected despite local protests ("Moko Jumbie: No Mockery of Justice" 271)
and discussions of how use of the figure would be a "reclamation by the
oppressed of a measure of justice" 27 2 because plantation owners had
prevented slaves from observing their religions and relegated the figure to
carnivals.
Mitchel then proposed Reaching Man (Figure 28), a bare-chested man
shown struggling to free himself from the block in which he was sculpted, to
symbolize the Islanders' "struggle for freedom." 2 73 But the local committee
preferred what was then called Market Woman and is now Lady of Justice.
This Justice stands, in bronze, six feet tall and on a pedestal outside the
courthouse doors. Her shirt is open-collared, and on her feet are sandals. She
has no sword, and her hair is mostly covered in a bandana-like scarf, with a
few curls visible. Comments from selection committee members noted that
she reflects the role of women in the family and served as a representative of
"the culture."274 Those descriptions suggest that the mix of classic Justice
iconography and darker skin was made comfortable through associations
with roles, such as service providers and caretakers, once assigned specially
to black women.275
Our other example of contemporary courthouse commissions comes from
Boston where, in the early 1990s, the architect Henry Cobb was selected to
design a new courthouse for the federal appellate and trial courts that sit in
Boston, Massachusetts. His enthusiasm for creating a special building was
shared by Douglas Woodlock, a judge on the district court, deeply
engaged-as his essay Communities and the Courthouses They Deserve.
And Vice Versa. illustrates 27 6-with public architecture. Woodlock was
joined by Stephen Breyer (then on the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
before his appointment to the United States Supreme Court) and likewise
270. Memorandum from the Clerk of the District Court of the Virgin Islands (around May 1991),
GSA Archive, AA 208, supra note 265.
271. Letter from Shirryl Hughes, ST. CROiX Avis, July 11, 1991, at 6, 27, in GSA Archives, AA 208,
supra note 265.
272. STX Courthouse Sculpture is Cultural Link, VIRGIN ISLANDS Bus. J., Aug. 12-25, 1991, in GSA
Archives, AA 208, supra note 265.
273. GSA Archives, AA 208, supra note 265.
274. Artist Proposal Meeting, in id.
275. See, e.g., Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 WIs. L. REv. 539.
276. See Douglas P. Woodlock, Communities and the Courthouses They Deserve. And Vice
Versa., 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 271 (2012) [hereinafter Woodlock, Communities]; see also Douglas
P. Woodlock, Drawing Meaning from the Heart of the Courthouse, in CELEBRATING THE
COURTHOUSE: A GUIDE FOR ARCHITECTS, THEIR CLIENTS, AND THE PUBLIC 155-67 (Steven Flanders
ed., 2006) [hereinafter CELEBRATING THE COURTHOUSE]; Douglas P. Woodlock, The "Peculiar
Embarrassment": An Architectural History of the Federal Courts in Massachusetts, 74 MASS. L.
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Figure 29.
The Great Hall, John Joseph
Moakley United States
Courthouse, Boston, 4 ,
Massachusetts, 1998. Architect:
Henry N. Cobb. Photographer:
Steve Rosenthal.
See also Color Plate 5.
Copyright: Steve Rosenthal, 1998. Reproduced
with the permission of the photographer and
cour-tesy of the court.
focused on the project of public architecture and courtroom access.277
Cobb, Woodlock, and Breyer took as their model a one-room courthouse
in Virginia that, in 1735, had been "the center of its community." 278 The
result, opened in 1998, is a ten-story building with twenty-seven courtrooms
supported by "three quarters of a million square feet of bureaucratic support
space." 279  A huge conoidal section of glass forms one wall of the
courthouse, emblematic (in the architect's words) of the building as "open
and accessible to all," yet also distinct and separate from "everyday life of
the street." 2 80 The glass wall (in Figure 29 and Color Plate 5) dominates the
public space by sheltering an atrium that permits views of seven stories.281
The art commission went to Ellsworth Kelly, who created The Boston
Panels, twenty-one aluminum and enamel panels of varying colors (Figure
277. See, e.g., Stephen G. Breyer, Foreword to CELEBRATING THE COURTHOUSE, supra note 276,
at 9-12. Our thanks to Stephen Breyer, Douglas Woodlock, Henry Cobb, Steve Rosenthal, William
Young, Nancy Gertner, Ellsworth Kelly, and Robert Campbell, all of whom helped us to understand
the form and function of this courthouse.
278. See Henry N. Cobb, Third Lecture in the N.Y. Court of Appeals Lecture Series, The Shape
of Justice: Law and Architecture (Nov. 16, 2006), in an unpaginated monograph published by the




281. Thanks to Steve Rosenthal for permission to reproduce his photographs (Figures 29, 30 & 3 1) of
the court's interior and to Ellsworth Kelly for his permission, as well as to the Boston Courthouse, the
GSA, and Judge Woodlock for facilitating the use of these images.
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Figure 30. The Boston Panels, Ellsworth Kelly, 1998, John Joseph Moakley
United States Courthouse, Boston, Massachusetts. Photographer: Steve
Rosenthal. See also Color Plate 4.
Copyright: Steve Rosenthal, 1998. Reproduced with the pernssion of the photographer and courtesy of the court.
30 and Color Plate 4) intended to function as a single work of art.282 The
nine horizontal panels in the central rotunda are about eleven feet by thirteen
and a half feet. The verticals, about the same height and seven and a half feet
wide, hang in pairs at the ends of the hallways on several floors.
Kelly explained that The Boston Panels were themselves governed "by
measure and balance." 283 In this Issue, Judge Woodlock sees The Boston
Panels as an "invitation to future litigants, lawyers, jurors, and judges to
inscribe their own meanings on the walls of the courthouse." 284 In his
commentary here, Brian Soucek rejects such a privatizing reading by
arguing that the Panels' beauty provides the "rapture of seeing" that
valorizes the authority of the observer. 285 Soucek argues that Kelly's
insistent visuality is a counterpoint to judge-centric imagery and is,
therefore, particularly apt for courthouses, constitutionally mandated to be
282. See GSA, The Boston Panels, Ellsworth Kelly, U.S. Courthouse and General Services
Administration, U.S. Courthouse, Boston, MA, The Artwork, in GSA Archives, Public Building Services,
Fine Arts Collection, AA 283 Kelly.
283. See Christine Temin, Court ofMany Colors: Ellsworth Kelly Installs a Major Commission in the
City Where He Got His Art Start, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 16, 1998, at Cl, C8.
284. Woodlock, Communities, supra note 276, at 283-84.
285. Brian Soucek, Not Representing Justice: Ellsworth Kelly's Abstraction in the Boston
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open and committed to public "viewing" as a "civic virtue." 28 6 David
Rosand reads the "chromatic neutrality of black" at the center of the nine
panels to symbolize "the legal neutrality of judgment," and proffers that
Kelly's abstraction of values provides an "eloquent model for the moral
vision of the twenty-first century." 287
Ellsworth Kelly's monochromes also avoid the questions of what Justice
might, could, or does look like. 288 In the 1930s, federally funded arts
programs had avoided abstraction, 28 9 preferring "representational" to
"nonrepresentational" art.290 What the WPA formerly considered avant-
garde (read "foreign" and "Russian") is, ironically, now a conservative
response to the complexity of Justice iconography in democracies.
VII. CAMP JUSTICE AT GUANTANAMO BAY AND PRIVATE COURTS
The move to abstraction is not unique to courthouses avoiding positing
any one visage as the embodiment of Justice. During the twentieth
century, representational and allegorical imagery lost its prominence, and
technology multiplied the visuals competing for attention. Justice
iconography was eclipsed by designer buildings, the product-as Norman
Spaulding also maps29 '-of the professional authority of architects,
lawyers, and judges, as well as the need to meet expanding rights to court
services and legal commitments to certain forms of process. Kim
Scheppele's contribution-Judges as Architects-explores the "deeply
symbolic-and homologous-relationship between law and
architecture,"2 92 while we focus on how courthouses came to replace
Justice personifications to serve not only as icons for justice but as
markers of government more generally.293
Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century constitutions created substantive
286. Id. at 304.
287. David Rosand, The Color ofJustice and Other Observations: A Response, 24 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 305, 307 (2012).
288. Minutes from the committee's considerations of other artists included comments by
committee members that some were "too partisan" or would highlight "one culture." Draft Artist
Selection Meeting Minutes, Oct. 21, 1993, at 2, in GSA Archives, AA 283, supra note 282. According
to one participant, our essay, Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Images of Justice, 96 YALE L.J. 1727
(1987), had affected their view that the symbolism associated with justice had become popularized to a
degree that diluted its meaning. See Honorable Douglas Woodlock, Comments at the Symposium on the
Art and Architecture of Civic Buildings, U.S. Courthouse, District of Massachusetts 5-6 (Sept. 24, 1998).
289. HARRIS, supra note 237, at 169 n.51.
290. Id. at 25.
291. See Norman W. Spaulding, The Enclosure of Justice: Courthouse Architecture, Due
Process, and the Dead Metaphor of Trial, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 311 (2012); see also LINDA
MULCAHY, LEGAL ARCHITECTURE: JUSTICE, DUE PROCESS AND THE PLACE OF LAW (2010).
292. Kim Lane Scheppele, Judges as Architects, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 345, 349 (2012)
(emphasis omitted).
293. See RESNIK& CURTIS, supra note 2, at 134-82.
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entitlements to courts. 2 94 Twentieth-century equality movements made all
persons entitled to claim those rights, producing new demands for
adjudication. Just as egalitarian norms make Justice representation
problematic, they likewise pose difficulties for the delivery of court services.
Aspirations for what courts ought to provide are encapsulated in a
description, provided by Justice Breyer, about why good public buildings
for courts are so important.
A court, unlike a government agency, deals not with the public en
masse but with the individual citizen who appears before it. It
devotes as much time and attention to that individual's specific
problem as the problem requires. In this modern age, when people
fear government's dehumanizing tendencies, it is particularly
important to emphasize that the judicial branch of government treats
each citizen before it not as a member of a group but as a separate
human being with a right to call upon the court's considerable
resources to resolve his or her specific dispute with whatever effort
that may take.295
That right is not only challenged by the volume of claimants but also by
arguments that the public, labor-intensive, processes of adjudication are
expensive, overly adversarial, and insufficiently generative. At the outset,
we flagged the number of filings (fifty million) in state courts, now facing
acute financial problems. Millions of litigants cannot afford lawyers; in
2009, 4.3 million civil litigants were in California courts without lawyers,
and 2.3 million were in the same position in New York.29 6 Hazel Genn's
discussion (focused on what civil justice is "for") details cutbacks in funding
in England, where the government proposed the closing of 142 courthouses
as it-and judges--counseled against the use of courts.297
Kim Scheppele argues that, during the twentieth century, architecture
moved "from a modernist program of general social improvement through
design, to a postmodernist program of professional eclecticism in which
multiple messages are encoded in buildings." 298 Legal dispute resolution
processes have followed a similar trajectory, shifting from a courtroom-
centered, public display to a diverse set of activities, many of which are
increasingly private. Fiscal crises have joined social and political critiques
in prompting changes dismantling the signature features-independent
294. Judith Resnik, The Childress Lecture: Constitutional Entitlements to and in Courts:
Remedial Rights in an Age of Egalitarianism, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. (forthcoming 2012); Resnik,
Fairness in Numbers, supra note 5, at 82.
295. Breyer, supra note 277, at 11.
296. See Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note 5, at 92-93.
297. Genn, supra note 18, at 413; see Owen Bowcott, Cuts Threaten To Close 142 Courts, THE
GUARDIAN, Apr. 1, 2011.
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and protected judges welcoming all persons in dignified and equal
treatment in a public forum-that have come in the twentieth century to
mark institutions as courts.
That shift can be glimpsed with a few, final graphics. In new federal
courthouses, courtrooms remain the centerpiece. Illustrative are the
carefully designed rooms in the Boston Courthouse (Figure 3 1),299 where,
as Judge Woodlock explains, the "most prominent geometric feature ...
is repetition of encompassing circles" that underscore that courtroom
activities are a "shared community undertaking;" each side of the
courtroom is marked by arches of equal size behind the judge, the jury,
and the public to make plain that all are "equally ennobled."300
In 1998, when that courthouse opened, a total of 142 civil and 48
criminal trials took place in the federal trial courts in Massachusetts. 30 1
The result was that about seven or eight trials were held per courtroom
during the new courthouse's inaugural year.30 2 Of course, trials are not the
only proceeding for which courtrooms are used. Defendants who plead
Figure 31. Courtroom 1, John Joseph Moakley United States
Courthouse, Boston, Massachusetts. Architect: Henry N. Cobb.
Photographer: Steve Rosenthal.
Copyright: Steve Rosenthal, 1998. Reproduced with the permission of the photographer and courtesy
of the court.
299. The photograph of the Boston Courthouse courtroom in Figure 31 is reproduced courtesy of
the photographer Steve Rosenthal and with the permission of the court.
300. Woodlock, Communities, supra note 276, at 279-80.
301. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1998 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 178 tbl.C-7 (1999), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/dirrpt98/cO7sep98.pdf.
302. That estimate focused on federal district court trials in Boston, and not on cases heard in
Springfield, Massachusetts, where trials could have taken place. See infra note 338, on the 2010 data
that likewise includes both sites.
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guilty must do so in open court; judges must sentence in public, and oral
arguments and other hearings in civil cases take place in courtrooms. Yet,
one study in the late 1990s found that federal courtrooms have their
"lights on"-defined as in use for part of a day-about half of the time.303
The statistics on trial rates in Boston are illustrative of national trends.
In 1962, on average, federal judges presided at thirty-nine trials a year; by
2002, "the average federal district judge presided over only about nine
trials."30 4 State courts have much higher levels of filing and of public
proceedings; yet data from the states show a comparable pattern of
declining numbers of trials, 3os and funding challenges have resulted in
cutbacks in times when courts are open and staff available.
This occasion is not the one to map all the modes of change, their
rationales, or their import.3 06 Rather, we offer three representations of this
transformation. Contrast the thoughtful and value-infused design of the
Boston courtroom above with the alternative set of values displayed in our
own cell phone contract (Figure 32), mailed to us several years ago.
Provided are requirements that we waive our rights to court and to class
actions (whether in court or in arbitration) and instead may only bring
claims against the service provider individually and exclusively through a
private arbitration process designated by the provider.30 7 In 2011, a bare
majority of the United State Supreme Court held that federal arbitration
law makes such provisions enforceable, despite state court conclusions
that such one-sided provisions were unconscionable.30 s
303. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COURTHOUSE CONSTRUCTION: BETIER
COURTROOM USE DATA COULD ENHANCE FACILITY PLANNING AND DECISIONMAKING, GAO/GGD-
97-39, at 2-3 (1997). The 1997 GAO study defined courtroom usage as "any activity" (including but
not limited to trials) for any portion of the day and looked at sixty-five courtrooms in seven locations
before concluding that courtrooms were in use about 54 percent of the days when courthouses were
open. Id. at 10. The judiciary has since developed a different measure of use-"latent use"-to
capture proceedings scheduled but cancelled. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, THE USE OF COURTROOMS
IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS: A REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITEEE ON COURT
ADMINISTRATION AND CASE MANAGEMENT (2008).
304. Mark R. Kravitz, The Vanishing Trial: A Problem in Need of a Solution?, 79 CONN. BAR J.
1, 5 (2005). As Judge Kravitz noted, while the number of trials per judge had decreased, the length of
trials had increased. Id. at 5-6.
305. Galanter, supra note 21, at 506-513; see also Brian J. Ostrom, Shauna M. Strickland &
Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Examining Trial Trends in State Courts: 1976-2002, 1 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 755 (2004).
306. See Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution
Movement Is Re-shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L. REv. 165 (2003); Judith Resnik, Many
Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 211 (1995).
307. This contract is typical of those provided. See Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note 5, at
118-133.
308. See AT&T v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). Several other states had, like California,
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before filing in a safe place.
YOUR CELLULAR SERVICE AGREEMENT
Tis grmiat far adlular srion bwen yu md bur wiau [coany]solsyour a ov
kgl ri a min paymordfts, ^nge, sa aing sevio4 caly trmiton fee,
limiaons of libilty, setmeofdispubynetrul awbdrion insdofjury idala mlass
atins, and odiilumtattpi. PLEASE READ THIS AGREEMENT AND YOUR PRICE
PLAN. IF YOU DISAGREE WITH THEM YOU DON'T HAVE TO ACCEPT THIS
AGREEMENT.
IF YOU'RE ANEW CUSTOMER, THIS AGREEMENT STARTS WHEN YOU OPEN THE
INSIDE PACKAGE OF ANY CELL PHONE YOU RECEIVED WITH THIS AGREMET....
IF YOU DON'T WANT TO ACCEPT AND BE BOUND BY THIS AGREEMENT, DON'T DO
ANY OF THOSE THINGS. INSTEAD, RETURN ANY CELL PHONE YOU RECEIVED WITH
THIS AGREEMENT (WrMOUf OPENING THE INSIDE PACKAGE) TO THE PLACE OF
PURCHASE WITIN 15 DAYS.
IF YOU'RE AN EISTING CUSTOMER UNDER A PRIOR FORM OF AGREEMENT, YOUR
ACCEPTING THIS AGREEMENT IS ONE OF THE CONDITIONS FOR OUR GRANTING YOU
ANY OF THB FOLLOWING CHANGES IN SERVICE YOU MAY REQUEST: A NEW PRICE
PIAN, A NEW PROMOTION, ADDITIONAL UNES IN SERVICE, OR ANY OTHER CHANGE
WE MAY DESIGNATE WHEN YOU REQUEST IT (SUCH AS A WAIVER OF CHARGES YOU
OWE). ... YOU CAN GO BACK TO YOUR OLD SERVICE UNDER YOUR PRIOR
AGREEMENT AND PRICE PLAN BY CONTACTING US ANY TIME BEFORE PAYING
YOUR FIRST BILL AFTER WE MAKE THE CHANGE YOU REQUESTED. OTHERWISE, IF
YOU PAY YOUR BIL4 YOU'RE CONFIRMING YOUR ACCEPTANCE OF THIS
AGREEMENT. IF YOU DON'T WANT TO ACCEPT THIS AGREEMENT, THEN DON'T
MAKE SUCH A CHANGE AND WE'LL CONTINUE TO HONOR YOUR OLD FORM OF
AGREEMENT UNLESS OR UNTIL YOU MAKE SUCH A CHANGE...
Figure 32. Example of cellular phone contract, 2002.
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INDEPENDENT ARBITRATION
INSTEAD OF SUING IN COURT, YOU'RE AGREEING TO ARBITRATE DISPUTES ARISING OUT
OFOR RELATED TO TIBS OR PRIOR AGREEMENTS. THIS AGREEMENT INVOLVES
COMMERCE AND111E FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT APPLIES TO IT. ARBITRATION ISN'T
THE SAME AS COURT. THE RULES ARE DIFFERENT AND THERE'S NO JUDGE AND JURY. YOU
AND WE ARE WAIVING RIGHTS TO PARTICIPATE IN CLASS ACTIONS, INCLUDING PUTATIVE
CLASS ACTIONS BEGUN BY OTHERS PRIOR TO THIS AGREEMENT, SO READ THIS
CAREFULLY. THIS AGREEMENT AFFECTS RIGHTS YOU MIGHT OTHERWISE HAVE IN SUCH
ACTIONS THAT ARE CURRENTLY PENDING AGAINST US OR OUR PREDECESSORS IN WHICH
YOU MIGHT BE A POTENTIAL CLASS MEMBER. (We retain our right to complain to any reulatory
agmcy or counmaio.) YOU AND WE EACH AGREE THAT, TO THE FULLEST EXTENT POSSIBLE
PROVIDED BY LAW:
(1) ANY CONTROVERSY OR CLAIM ARISING OUT OF OR RELATING TO THIS AGREEMENT, OR TO
ANY PRIOR AGREEMEM FOR CELLULAR SERVICE WfITH US. .. WILL BE SETfLED BY
INDEPENDENT ARBITRATION INVOLVING A NEUTRAL ARBITRATOR AND ADMINISTERED BY
THE AMERICAN ARBURATION ASSOCIATION ("AAA- UNDER WIRELESS INDUSTRY
ARBITRATION ("WIA) RULES, AS MODIFIED BY THIS AGREEMENT. WIA RULES AND FEE
INFORMATION ARE AVAILABLE FROM US OR THE AAA;
(2) EVEN IF APPLICABLE LAW PERMITS CLASS ACTIONS OR CLASS ARBITRATIONS, YOU
WAIVE ANY RIGrr TO PURSUE ON A CLASS BASIS ANY SUCH CONTROVERSY OR CLAIM
AGAINST US... AND WE WAIVE ANY RIGHT TO PURSUE ON A CLASS BASIS ANY SUCH
CONTROVERSY OR CLAIM AGAINST YOU....
(3) No abitratmo has auhoity to awant relief in ecss of wbt this agremut pwides ar to ankrconsolidatim
or class bitin. except that an bitator deciding aclaimarising out of or stating to apio aremnact may
gant as much mbstanwive relief an a mda basis as such pnor agrmect would permit NO MATTER WHAT
ELSE THIS AGREEMENT SAYS, fT DOESN'T AFFECT THE SUBSTANCE OR AMOUNT OF ANY
CLAIM YOU MAY ALREADY HAVE AGAINST US OR ANY OF OUR AFFILIATES OR PREDECESSORS
IN INTEREST PRIORTOTHIS AGREEMENT. THIS AGREEMENT JUST REQUIRES YOU TO
ARBITRATE SUCH CLANS ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS. In aritrations, the atbitrator mut give offed to
applicable statutea of limitations and will decide whether an iue is arbitrabecr not. In a largeoemplex Came
arbitration, the arbitators must also apply the Federal Rules d Evidene ad the loing party may have dhe award
reviewed by a panel of 3 arbitrators.
(4) IF FOR SOME REASON THESE ARBITRATION REQUIREMENTS DON'T APPLY, YOU AND
WE EACH WAIVE, TO THE FULLEST EXTENT ALLOWED BY LAW, ANY TRIAL BY JURY. A
JUDGE WILL DECIDE ANY DISPUTE INSTEAD;
(5) NO MATTER WHAT ELSE THIS AGREEMENT SAYS, IT DOESN'T APPLY TO OR AFFECT THE
RIGHTS IN A CERTIFIED CLASS ACTION OVA MEMBER OF A CERTIFIED CLASS WHO FIRST
RECEIVES TIUS AGREEMENT AFTER HIS CLASS HAS BEEN CERTIFIED, OR THE RIGHTS IN
AN ACTION OF A NAMED PLAINTIFF, ALTHOUGH IT DOES APPLY TO OTHER ACTIONS,
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The poor visual quality of the document makes its own point. Just as
readers of these pages are unlikely to delve into its provisions, those who
find these clauses in packaging (or on job applications) are similarly
unlikely to read the terms. The unreadability embodies their
"unreadness," which is also economical. Reading is a waste of time
because the provision is a "take it or leave it" clause, avoided only by
not buying that phone service. Calling this document a "contract" is thus
a misnomer, for it is neither bargained for nor subject to bargaining.309 In
this sense, the contract too is generally unseen, which is one of the
reasons for its production here.
A second marker of contemporary dispute resolution shifts the focus
from everyday consumer transaction to Guantinamo Bay, which, after the
attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, gained worldwide
infamy as a prison for individuals detained by the United States. Initially,
more than 750 persons were housed at Guantinamo; by the end of 2011,
fewer than 175 remained.310 Although President Barack Obama sought, in
2008, to close the detention facility,3 1 members of Congress objected, and,
as of the end of 2011, Congress has required that Guantinamo continue to
house detainees and to serve as a site for decisions about their
confinement.3 12
In an Executive Order issued in November of 2001, then President George
W. Bush decreed that the status of Guantinamo detainees was to be
determined by ad hoc processes organized under the Department of
Defense.3 13 In 2004, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the federal
courts had jurisdiction to consider the legality of detention at GuantAnamO 314
and that the constitutional guarantee of due process constrained the
government's treatment of at least the detainees who were American
citizens.315 The executive branch has since set up various proceedings for
detainees.
The procedures created bear some resemblance to administrative
adjudication in the United States," 6 with methods to determine if detainees
309. Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 Am. U. L. REV. 131, 132 (1970); Resnik, Fairness
in Numbers, supra note 5, at 127-133.
310. Guantanamo: Ten Years On, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Jan. 6,2012, http://www.hrw.org/news/
2012/01/06/guantanamo-ten-years.
311. Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,897 (Jan. 22, 2009).
312. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, 125 Stat.
1298 (2011).
313. See Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in
the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16,2001).
314. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
315. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
316. See, e.g., Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Order Establishing Combatant
Status Review Tribunal [CSRT], July 7, 2004. The Military Commissions Act of 2006 gave a
statutory basis to the CSRT. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 801, 948 (2006); 32 C.F.R. § 10.3 (2003); see also
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are "unprivileged enemy combatants" 3 17  and to provide military
commissions to "try" a small subset. But even as improved under the Obama
Administration,' the Department of Defense does not rely on independent
judges, standing outside the chain of military command, nor has it conceded
that constitutional rights accorded the public and criminal defendants
apply.3 19 Closed-circuit television may be available but only at the option of
the Defense Department, which also controls permission to enter the base
through travel by air or sea.320
Thus, when eschewing both the regular federal court system (in which
other terrorists had been tried since the 1990s) and military courts that have
existed for decades, the Executive and Congress created an ad hoc, sui
generis set of procedures that seek, in many respects, to gain legitimacy
through invoking the imagery of courts. In addition to offering website
images of courtroom-like setups and graphics of how rights at GuantiAnamo
compare with those in courts, flags fly over a sign designating the site as
"Camp Justice" (Figure 33) with the logo of the Office of Military
Commissions (Figure 34),321 echoing back to Ma'at, albeit substituting an
eagle for a female with an ostrich feather in her cap. The seal is a variation
on that of the Department of Defense, which is, in turn, a variation on the
Seal of the United States.322 In the Camp Justice version, the Defense
Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a-950t (Supp. III 2010).
317. The term in 2004 had been "enemy combatant," and in 2011 became "unprivileged enemy
combatant." National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 §§ 1031-32, Pub. L. No. 112-81,
125 Stat. 1298 (2011).
318. See, e.g., Military Commissions Act of 2009.
319. See id. §949b(b) (amended by National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012
§ 1034(b)).
320. The Obama Administration policies replace more restrictive provisions. Media Ground Rules
for Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba, DEP'T OF DEF. (Sept. 10, 2010), http://www.defense.gov/news/
d20100910groundrules.pdf; see JTF-GTMO Media Policy, Guantinamo Bay NAS, Cuba, as of June
2006.
321. The photographs of Camp Justice in Figures 33 and 34, taken in the fall of 2009 by Travis
Crum (Yale Law School, 2011), are provided and reproduced with his permission.
322. Official seals are, in contrast, designed by the Institute of Heraldry of the United States. The
Defense Department's Seal, approved in 1947, include the eagles "as an emblem of strength ...
defending the United States, represented by the shield of thirteen pieces . . . joined together by a blue
chief representing Congress." See Department of Defense Seal, THE INSTITUTE OF HERALDRY,
http://www.tioh.hqda.pentagon.mildefault.aspx (last visited Feb. 13, 2012).
The Seal of the United States also includes an eagle at its center with thirteen stars over its head,
thirteen arrows (resembling a lictor rod) in one talon, and an olive branch in another. The original
proposal, by "Dr. Franklin, Mr. J. Adams and Mr. Jefferson," called for the "Goddess of Liberty" and
the "Goddess of Justice bearing a sword in her right hand and in her left a Balance." GAILLARD
HUNT, THE SEAL OF THE UNITED STATES: How IT WAS DEVELOPED 5-6 (1892). The final design,
adopted in 1789, included neither but did preserve two of their suggestions, "the Eye of Providence in
the triangle,... and the motto E pluribus unum." Id. at 7.
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Reproduced with the permission of the
photographer.
Figure 34. Logo, Department of Defense, Office of Military
Commissions, 2009. Photographer: Travis Crum.
Reproduced with the permission of the photographer.
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Department's eagle-with a shield of red, white, and blue, three arrows, and
thirteen stars-is encircled at the top by the Department's name.
The imagery is (unwittingly or not) revelatory; the effort to dress
Guantinamo Bay up as a court aims to bolster its legitimacy but placing a
bird of prey with arrows at the center of the balance inside a pentagon
reflects just how enclosed those at Guantinamo are. They are not accorded
the same equal, public, and dignified treatment that became the rights of
ordinary civil and criminal litigants in the twentieth century. And the words
at the logo's bottom likewise underscore the distance; eschewed is the
phrase ensconced at the top of the Supreme Court-Equal Justice for All-
in favor of "Freedom through Justice."
One might well think of Guantinamo as isolated in both the literal and
legal senses. But its procedures are not as foreign to contemporary
decisionmaking as one might wish.323 As Alexandra Lahav, Nancy Gertner,
Norman Spaulding, and Hazel Genn's contributions detail,3 24 reforms in
U.S. courts and agencies, in England and elsewhere, similarly push away the
public processes of adjudication and reduce the guarantees of independent
jurists. The privacy renders both judges and disputants vulnerable. The
public rituals that Oscar Chase and Jonathan Thong analyzed as sustaining
understandings of faimess3 25 are not built into the devolution of adjudication
to administrative bodies and outsourcing to private providers, even as those
procedures try to lay claim to the legitimacy of courts by miming, but yet not
mooring to, some of its forms.
Our third marker of this century is a poly-vocal image permitting another
glimpse of the shift from public to private courts while also recording the
injustices that courts have spawned. The William Clift photograph,
Reflections, Old St. Louis County Courthouse, Missouri (Figure 35), also
graces the cover of this Issue. In the nineteenth century, the Old St. Louis
Courthouse was the site of the trial of Dred and Harriet Scott, whose names
became iconic for the horrors of slavery and the failures of law.326 Although
323. The forms of detention are also not as idiosyncratic. See Judith Resnik, Detention, The War
on Terror, and The Federal Courts, 110 COLUM. L. REv. 579 (2010).
324. Nancy Gertner, From "Rites" to "Rights": The Decline of the Criminal Jury Trial, 24
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 433 (2012); Alexandra D. Lahav, Rites Without Rights: A Tale of Two Military
Commissions, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 439 (2012); see also Genn, supra note 18; Spaulding, supra
note 291.
325. Oscar G. Chase & Jonathan Thong, Judging Judges: The Effect of Courtroom Ceremony on
Participant Evaluation ofProcess Fairness-Related Factors, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 221 (2012).
326. See DONALD F. DosCH, THE OLD COURTHOUSE (1979). The building, opening in 1828, was
used as both a state and federal courthouse. Enlarged thereafter, it was remodeled in the 1850s. Old
Courthouse Architecture, JEFFERSON NATIONAL EXPANSION MEMORIAL, http://www.nps.gov/jeff/
planyourvisit/old-courthouse-architecture.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2012). The Dred Scott
proceedings, from trials through the Missouri Supreme Court hearing, were held there. Id. A rich
history is provided in DOSCH, supra, at 100-10; and LEA VANDERVELDE, MRS. DRED SCOTT 232-319
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rigure D. Ixertections, uta N. Louis county Uourtnouse, ivlssourt, william unIt, t /o.
Provided and reproduced with the permission of the photographer
a Missouri jury had, in the 1850s, ordered the Scotts free, the state supreme
court and the United States Supreme Court concluded that they were legally
slaves. Chief Justice Taney's opinion for the Supreme Court held that the
Constitution put slaves ("beings of an inferior order") outside citizenship and
hence, that they lacked juridical voice even to challenge the state holding.327
The Old St. Louis Courthouse was also the site of Virginia Minor's
litigation seeking, in 1872, to vote as a citizen of the United States. In 1875,
in Minor v. Happersett, Virginia Minor argued that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the recently enacted Fourteenth Amendment endowed
her, as a woman, with new rights. The United States Supreme Court denied
her equality. Minor was (unlike the Scotts) recognized as a citizen of the
United States but not guaranteed voting rights which, the Court held,
depended on state law.328
was used as a "public forum" as well as a court. DOSCH, supra, at 66-87.
327. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407, 450-53 (1856) (striking provisions of the
Missouri Compromise that declared it a free territory and holding that the Fifth Amendment protected
the rights of slaveholders in the "property" that was their slaves).
328. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 178 (1875); DOSCH, supra note 326, at 98-99.
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The Old Courthouse stands as a testament to injustices promulgated in the
name of the United States Constitution. This image makes plain that our
project entails no romance of courts as intrinsically just. Rather, we
appreciate their potential to redistribute power from government to
individual, from one side of a case to another, and from disputants and
decisionmakers to the audience. Through participatory parity, public
processes can teach about practices of norm development and offer the
opportunity for popular input to produce changes in legal rights. The
redundancy of various claims of rights enables debate about the
underlying legal rules. These facets are democratic responses to the
disquieting fact that judicial power entails the use of violence in the name of
the state.
When that issue is engaged in open court processes, we-those outside the
immediate dispute-have a role in understanding, legitimating,
delegitimating, and interpreting what law means, what justice entails, what
the predicates of its practices are, and whether the resulting violence is
acceptable or intolerable. Such "democratic iterations" provide dense sets of
interactions that can, over time, function as a mechanism to limit the scope
of rulers' powers and change normative precepts. 3 29 Thus, to create public
spaces as active sites requires normative commitments to a political
theory of courts in democracies as obliged to provide independent judges
hearing both sides of disputes and according equal and dignified treatment of
claimants before a public empowered to respond.
Illustrative are the contemporary repudiations of Dred Scott and of Minor
v. Happersett, undone by the Civil War, constitutional amendments
thereafter, and political and social movements (of which the litigations were
a part) that embrace a profoundly different conception of personhood and of
justice. And of course, democratic engagement does not inevitably yield
results that could be termed progressive. Like other sites of democratic
ordering, popular will can be propelled in a variety of directions. In the
context of adjudication, public trials also help sustain commitments to the
death penalty and to harsh sanctions for certain kinds of offenders.
The authority of the audience is what some seek to escape. As Michel
Foucault famously mapped the move from public to private punishment
(when the "great spectacle of punishment ran the risk of being rejected by
the very people to whom it was addressed," the state developed prisons to
assert coercion removed from public view),330 so we map the privatization of
litigation, putting at risk the modern phenomenon of "rights" of access to
329. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
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court for everyone, newly empowered to seek accountings from previously
impervious actors. The procedures encoded in Guantinamo Bay and in the
documents purchased with cell phones are threats to those entitlements.
These public and private disciplinary powers increasingly rely on practices
that do not admit of a need to show their processes in order to justify the
exercise of authority.
Courthouses have become so familiar that one might assume that they
always existed, just as the rights that adjudication has come to signify feel
deeply entrenched. Inside the many purpose-built structures is the "pearl of
the courtroom" (to borrow, again, from Judge Woodlock)."' As building
manuals dictate, the courtroom is the one designated space in which judges,
otherwise "completely separated from the public," can interact with
disputants before the public.332 Yet, even though the exterior glass facades
of many new courthouses are designed to convey openness,3 33 not much
remains to be seen, and as the discussion of the cell phone contract and
Guantdnamo Bay illustrates, more is moving offsite. And even in
courthouses, one finds "too little publicity, with a consequent increase of
secrecy, in areas hitherto considered public."3 34 While remaining "public,"
the appellation denotes, as Habermas put it, that a structure "simply
house[s] state institutions." 3
William Clift's late twentieth-century photograph of the Old St. Louis
Courthouse (Figure 35) records that trajectory.336 In the 1930s, the
courthouse was abandoned in favor of a new Civil Courts Building and then
rescued for renovation as a national monument-formally confirmed in
1940 under President Franklin Roosevelt.3 ' The building functions as a
museum, which is what we fear may be the twenty-first century fate of other
monumental courthouses.33 8 Moreover, what Clift shows is the Old
Courthouse reflected in a structure known, in the 1970s, as the Equitable
331. Woodlock, Drawing Meaning, supra note 276.
332. Jordan Gruzen, Cathy Daskalakis & Peter Krasnow, The Geometry ofa Courthouse Design,
in CELEBRATING THE COURTHOUSE, supra note 276, at 83, 90.
333. Id. at 108.
334. See Maure L. Goldschmidt, Publicity, Privacy and Secrecy, 7 W. POL. Q. 401, 401 (1954).
335. HABERMAS, supra note 9, at 2.
336. Our thanks to William Clift for providing us with the image in Figure 35 and permission to use
it. His photograph, taken in conjunction with the Seagram Court House Project, is also in the collection of
the Yale University Art Gallery and can be found in the volume COURT HOUSE 31 (Richard Pare ed.,
1978).
337. DOSCH, supra note 326, at 111-15.
338. Recall that when the Boston Courthouse opened in 1998, 190 trials had begun, or seven to eight
per courtroom, see supra note 301; by 2010, the number was down to 115 civil and criminal trials, or five
per courtroom (plus providing space for thirty civil and fifty-four criminal contested hearings on
motions and twelve sentencing hearings entailing evidence). See U.S. District Courts-Civil and
Criminal Trials, by District, During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2010, UNITED
STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2010/appendices/
TO1SeplO.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2012).
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Life Building."' The building behind the reflected image of the courthouse
is now the regional headquarters of the American Arbitration Association.
The flat glass of the International Style skyscraper lends the appearance of a
court subsumed by the corporate structure it now faces.
This picture provides a fitting closing for this analysis reflecting centuries
of change that leaves us, inevitably, in medias res. The disquieting image of
the Old St. Louis Courthouse is one vision of what the future could include.
In Representing Justice, we provided examples of alternative imagery (new
exempla iustitiae), just as several contributors to this Issue argue for our eyes
to look beyond the repertoire of imagery and practices currently so
commonplace that the degree to which they have been made-by acts of
political and social will-sometimes passes, unseen.3 40
339. The building, designed by Hellmuth, Obata + Kassabaum and built in 1971, was renovated in the
1990s and purchased by the Hertz Investment Group in 2007 from the AXA Equitable Life Insurance
Company. See Equitable Building Under Contract, ST. Louis BUS. J., Jan. 5, 2007.
340. See, e.g., John Leubsdorf, Justice Unrepresented, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 247 (2012);
Simon, supra note 235. On the other hand, Ruth Weisberg argues that we need to see the usefulness
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